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• 
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* 
FLOYD R. SMUIN, * 
* 
Defendant, Appellant, * Argument Priority 
and Cross-Appellee. * Classification No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78-2A-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a final judgment entered by 
the Honorable Judge Dennis L. Draney, Eighth Judicial 
District Court, relative to a divorce proceeding entered 
August 22, 1990. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
appeal: 
1. Did the court correctly compute Plaintiff's alimony 
when it took into consideration that both parties worked and 
contributed to their life style, that Defendant has a 
substantial net income while Plaintiff is unable to work 
and her net income from disability payment is minimal in 
comparison. 
2. Did the court properly award permanent alimony to 
Plaintiff since there were no facts adduced at trial 
indicating any likelihood that Plaintiff, given her age and 
disabilities, has any potential to increase her income in 
the future. 
3. Did the trial court properly award health insurance 
to the Plaintiff in view of her severe and permanent 
disability and in view of the availability of insurance 
through Defendant's employment. 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
awarding the full amount of Defendant's retirement plan 
funds to Defendant in exchange for payment of one half of 
the marital debt of the parties without verifying the value 
of Defendant's retirement funds and without entering a 
2 
qualified domestic relations order, when facts indicated 
that Defendant's retirement funds and property might triple 
the amount of the marital debt and acccrued during 
the marriage of the parties. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
29 U.S.C.A. §1056(d) et seg. (West 1987 as amended)..19 
26 U.S.C.A. §162 (West 1990 as amended) 19 
26 U.S.C.A. §414 et seg. (West 1990 as amended).. . .16 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2), 1953 as amended. . .1 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings Below 
On November 24, 1989, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-
Appellant Patricia Smuin (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed a 
Complaint for Divorce claiming irreconcilable differences 
between the parties. Plaintiff requested among other things 
alimony; release from liability for the marital debts of the 
parties; medical and dental health insurance as available 
through the employment of Defendant-Appellant and Cross-
Appellee Floyd R. Smuin (hereinafter Defendant); and a 
qualified domestic relations order to facilitating an award 
to Plaintiff of one half of Defendant's retirement and 
profit-sharing plans. (R. 1) 
Course of the Proceedings 
Following a bench trial on May 30, 1991, Honorable 
Dennis L. Draney of the Eighth Judicial District Court 
granted Plaintiff a divorce. On June 11, 1990, Defendant 
filed an Objection to the Court's Decision which was not 
designated as a Motion under Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b) or 
59. On August 10, 1990, Plaintiff filed a Response to 
Defendant's Objection to Court's Decision. On August 27, 
1990, Defendant filed a Request for Ruling on his Objection 
to Court's Decision. 
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On August 22, 1990, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce were signed and entered by the 
trial court. On August 23, 1990, the Court entered a Ruling 
on Defendant's Objection to Court's Decision. 
On September 5, 1990, Plaintiff filed a Verified 
Petition for Order to Show Cause for enforcement of the 
court's decree because Defendant had not paid any alimony or 
insurance premiums, had threatened Plaintiff, and had not 
allowed Plaintiff to collect her personal belongings as 
previously agreed. On September 25, 1990, a hearing was 
held on the Order to Show Cause theretofore issued and the 
court entered its ruling for immediate enforcement of the 
decree. On September 28, 1990, a Notice of Appeal was filed 
by Defendant. On September 19, 1990, Plaintiff filed a 
Notice of Cross-Appeal. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
Pursuant to the decree of August 22, 1990, the court 
granted Plaintiff alimony in the amount of $400.00 per month 
to be paid by Defendant. The court chose not to limit this 
alimony to a definite period. (R. 48). The court further 
decreed that Defendant should pay approximately $130.00 per 
month (Tr. 99 L. 3-11) for the extended benefits of 
Defendant's health insurance coverage through his employment 
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covering his wife under the COBRA provisions. The marital 
debts of approximately $36,000.00 were to be paid by 
Defendant in exchange for which the Defendant was to obtain 
any and all interest he might have in the profit-sharing and 
retirement plans held through his employer. (R. 48). 
Plaintiff was awarded the 1975 Buick free and clear, 
while Defendant was awarded the 1973 trailer free and clear. 
The court also ordered that Defendant keep the 1987 Cadillac 
together with the indebtedness of $12,000.00 thereon. The 
contemporary award of personal property was confirmed. (R. 
48) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time that the parties were married on August 6, 
1975, (Tr. 16 L. 19), Plaintiff had one fifteen year old son 
living with her from a previous marriage, cind the recently 
widowed Defendant had his three children living with him. 
(Tr. 17 L. 15-25), Tr. 18 L. 1-12). Plaintiff took 
temporary leave from her full-time employment to help with 
the children and the home. (Tr. 19 L. 2-16, Tr. 40 L. 11-
25) . 
In 1981, increasing problems between the parties and 
with the children compelled the Plaintiff to move out of the 
home. (Tr 26 L. 20-25, Tr. 39 L. 16-19). Plaintiff lived 
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apart in a trailer that she purchased through her employment 
and continued to support herself and her son. (Tr. 27 L. 1-
13). The parties achieved at least partial reconciliation 
and continued their marital relationship, still holding 
themselves out to the community as husband and wife: they 
consistently dined, vacationed and weekended together; they 
named each other as beneficiaries in health and life 
insurance policies; they owned checking accounts and 
vehicles jointly; and they had physical marital 
relationships. (Tr. 28 - Tr. 35 L. 1), (Tr. 89 L. 9 - Tr. 
90 L. 15). 
In 1983, the parties entered into a children's clothing 
store business together. (Tr. 34 - Tr. 35 L. 1). The 
Plaintiff agreed albeit reluctantly that she would take on 
the management of the store. Defendant agreed to use part 
of the equity on the home that he owned prior to the 
marriage of the parties to finance the venture. (Tr. 35 L. 
21 - Tr. 36 L. 7). When the business failed within a year. 
Defendant blamed Plaintiff, even though business was 
depressed all over Uintah County because of the general 
recession and the collapse of oil-shale enterprises. (Tr. 
83 L. 16 - Tr. 34 L. 1). 
Subsequent to the failure of their business, the 
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parties continued in their separate employments and separate 
homes until May 15, 1988, when Plaintiff moved back with the 
Defendant. On June 27, 1988, she suffered from a brain 
aneurysm and was hospitalized. (Tr. 80 L. 5-9, Tr. 44 L. 5 
- L. 26). Plaintiff has been completely disabled since 
then. (Tr. 51 L. 23 - Tr. 52 L. 3). 
On February 16, 1989, Plaintiff had surgery on her 
remaining aneurysms and was cautioned to avoid all even 
slight trauma to the head. Defendant also was cautioned. 
(Tr. 45 L. 8 - Tr. 46 L. 8). On July 3, 1989, Plaintiff 
suffered additional damage, including double vision, 
confused thinking, lack of bladder control, and body 
numbness, consequent to a bump on her head. Plaintiff 
alleges that Defendant intentionally caused the bump. 
(Tr. 69 L. 7 - L. 18, Tr. 45 L. 11 - Tr. 48 L. 18). 
After this further deterioration in Plaintiff's 
condition and at Defendant's insistence, Plaintiff filed for 
divorce in November of 1989. Defendant took Plaintiff to 
file pro se in order to save money. (Tr. 61 L. 15 - Tr. 62 
L. 19). 
Plaintiff presently receives $427.00 monthly in Social 
Security Disability income. (Tr. 51 L. 23 - Tr. 52 L. 3). 
Defendant's Financial Statement of April, 1990, indicates a 
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gross income of $3,725.00 monthly. Testimony adduced at 
trial showed that upon retirement Defendant will receive at 
least $1,079.33 per month from Chevron and $268.33 from 
Stauffer's. (Tr. 87 L. 10 - 17). Additionally, a fully 
vested annuity fund from Defendant's present employer exists 
which was not discussed at trial, with a deferred value of 
$334.00 as calculated in April of 1983. (Defendant's 
Exhibit 8). Furthermore, all funds available to Defendant 
upon retirement through Social Security which would accrue 
in addition to the above sums were not mentioned by counsel 
or by the court. 
Preliminary calculations as presented at trial revealed 
the value of Defendant's retirement fund as approximately 
between $80,000.00 and $100,000.00. Debt of the marriage, 
including the approximate $12,000.00 owed on the 1987 El 
Dorado Cadillac, totalled approximately $47,000.00. 
(Tr. 82 L. 1 - L. 16, Defendant's Exhibits 1 - 2 ) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Awarding Plaintiff $400.00 in monthly alimony payments 
unlimited by any definite period was properly within the 
trial court's discretion and was an equitable determination 
given the facts and circumstances of the present case. 
Similarly, the award of health insurance to Plaintiff should 
be confirmed. A trial court has considerable discretion in 
adjusting financial and property interests of parties, and 
the Court of Appeals will not disturb the lower court's 
decision unless it is clearly an abuse of discretion. 
The lower court's decision allowing Defendant the right 
to all the proceeds from his retirement and profit-sharing 
funds in exchange for Defendant's responsibility for the 
full mortgage debt should be remanded so that a qualified 
domestic relations order be entered and a proper 
determination be made of the amount of money represented by 
one half of Defendant's retirement benefits earned during 
the course of the marriage. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN COMPUTING PLAINTIFF'S 
PERMANENT ALIMONY AWARD. 
A. The Lower Court correctly computed alimony when it 
took into account among other things the parties' relative 
incomes and the disability of the Plaintiff. 
It is settled in Utah that a divorce court has 
considerable discretion in adjusting financial and property 
interests of the parties, and that the Court of Appeals will 
not disturb a Court's decision unless it is clearly unjust 
or a clear abuse of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 
1149, 1151 (Utah App. 1988); Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779, 780 
(Utah 1986); Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 753 (Utah 1978). 
In awarding alimony, the trial court must consider 
three factors: (1) the financial condition and need of the 
receiving spouse; (2), the ability of the receiving spouse 
to produce sufficient income for him or herself; (3) the 
ability of the responding spouse to provide support. 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
The lower court calculated Plaintiff's alimony award 
equitably taking into consideration the relative incomes of 
the parties and the future earning potential of the 
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Defendant as well as the lack of earning potential of the 
Plaintiff. (R. 4). Plaintiff's gross and net monthly income 
is $427.00 from Social Security disability income. (Tr. 51 
L. 23). From this Plaintiff must pay rent and other monthly 
expenses including medical prescriptions totaling $892.75. 
(Tr. 58 L. 23). 
Defendant's gross monthly income is $3,725.00 with a 
net income of $2,620.38 (Defendant's Financial Statement). 
Defendant's calculations for monthly expenses of $1,860.43 
include the full debt assigned to him by the court, part of 
which is a payment in lieu of rent for the equity of his 
home in the amount of $476.55, and part of which is the debt 
on the 1987 Cadillac bought by and awarded to him. (Tr. 91 
L. 3-21, Defendant's Exhibit 1, Tr. 81 L. 1-19). 
Due to Plaintiff's total and permanent disability as 
adjudged by the Social Security Administration, (R. 49 L. 1-
5), it is not likely that she will be able to increase her 
present income in the future. If Plaintiff were to increase 
her income substantially, the lower court's decision would 
not prevent an appropriate modification at that time. 
Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 123. 
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B. The court properly considered the standard of 
living, the quality and the length of the marriage to arrive 
at an equitable result. 
The ultimate test of an alimony award is whether the 
party receiving alimony will be able to support him or 
herself as nearly as possible at the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage. Schindlerf 776 P.2d at 90. 
Testimony adduced at trial confirms that the alimony 
award allows Plaintiff merely to subsist at minimum levels 
and not to enjoy the pre-divorce standard of living. In 
contrast, Defendant will continue to enjoy his pre-divorce 
life, and probably will continue to improve it. (R. 63 L. 
24 - R. 65 L. 20). Thus the alimony award represents a 
minimum amount due the Plaintiff and is by no means 
inequitable to the Defendant. 
Contribution to the health and quality of the marriage 
as well as circumstances of the parties upon divorce 
constitute legitimate considerations of the trial court in 
its arrival at an equitable alimony award. Burt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In his brief, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's 
alleged lack of contribution to the marriage renders the 
alimony award inequitable. Defendant even mentions that he 
made a few payments on Plaintiff's car that she brought into 
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the marriage, an allegation first offered in his brief, 
totally unsupported by the record, and intended to bolster 
his premise that since Plaintiff contributed nothing to the 
marriage it would be inequitable to award her alimony. 
(Brief of Appellant at 5, but see Tr. 20 L. 9-11, Tr. 23-
25) . 
However, the facts adduced at trial reveal Plaintiff's 
considerables contributions to the marriage. Plaintiff 
contributed economically: through employment, through labor 
and skill in management of the business venture entered into 
by the parties, through inheritance invested in the expenses 
of the marriage, and through extensive personal property 
brought into the marriage. (Tr. 20 - Tr. 26, Tr. 96 L. 13-
23) . 
Plaintiff also contributed emotionally and socially to 
the relationship, first by taking responsibility for 
Defendant's home and children, including their medical and 
educational needs. (Tr. 26, Tr. 39 L. 3 - Tr. 40 L. 25). 
Later, Plaintiff continued to contribute to the marriage by 
living and supporting herself and her son separately, thus 
relieving some of the tensions in the household: the parties 
still spent most of their time together, dining, weekending, 
vacationing, and sustaining marital relationships together. 
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(Tr. 28-35 L. 1, Tr. 89 L. 9 - Tr. 90 L. 15). 
Defendant also claims that the years when the parties 
were not living together should not be "counted" as part of 
their marriage. (Brief of Appellant at 12-13). His further 
assertion that he "took Plaintiff back" after her aneurysms 
attacks (Brief of Appellant at 11-12) is patently false and 
unsupported by the record, as she returned to live with him 
approximately one month before her first attack, and was 
forced into divorce soon thereafter. (Tr. 80 L. 5-9, Tr. 44 
L. 5 - L. 26, Tr. 61 L. 15 - Tr. 62 L. 19). 
In any event, the trial court has wide discretion to 
evaluate the marital estate as of the date of the 
termination of the marriage, even if the parties have been 
separated. Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 
1987). Additionally, the trial court has discretion even to 
take into consideration the premarital assets of a party 
under appropriate circumstances to achieve an equitable 
alimony and property settlement award. Noble v. Noble, 761 
P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988). 
In the present case, the trial court's computation of 
alimony and its permanent assignment are equitably tailored 
to both parties' circumstances. Therefore the trial court's 
alimony award should be affirmed. 
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II. THE COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS 
TO PLAINTIFF ASIDE AND APART FROM ALIMONY. 
It has been argued above that the alimony award 
represents a minimum equitable award for Plaintiff, given 
her total inability to meet basic expenses without said 
award and given the ability of the Defendant to provide said 
award. 
The alimony award meets this minimum standard only 
because of the additional award of health insurance which 
enables Plaintiff to sustain her medical treatments without 
sinking to the abject poverty required for total Medicaid 
coverage. (Tr. 65 L. 21 - Tr. 65 L. 5). COBRA provisions 
in federal law facilitate continuing coverage for Plaintiff 
under Defendant's group policy, with Defendant remaining 
responsible for only 50% of the premium. See 26 U.S.C.A. 
162 (West 1990 as amended). 
The premium required to be paid by the Defendant was 
approximately $130.00 per month at the time of trial. (Tr. 
99 L. 3-8). Any additional premium amount would be 
accompanied by Defendant's corresponding cost of living 
raise. 
The trial court decided correctly that health benefits 
of all awards are essential to avoid Plaintiff's complete 
poverty and dependence on the state. Therefore Plaintiff's 
16 
health benefit award should be affirmed, 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DEFENDANT ALL THE 
RETIREMENT AND EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AS COMPENSATION FOR 
DEFENDANT RETAINING RESPONSIBILITY TO PAY THE MORTGAGE DEBT 
OF THE PARTIES. 
A. The court failed to perform the required accounting 
of sums available to Defendant through retirement and 
employment benefits earned during the course of the marriage 
of the parties• 
In Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court required the trial court to consider the 
value of the husband's retirement and employment accounts 
and to reapportion property distribution to offset the 
resulting values. The Gardner court stated that valuation 
of such accounts "should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Id. at 1078. See also Woodward v. Woodward, 656 
P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1982); and see, Enqlert v. Enqlert, 576 
P.2d 1274, 1276 (1978). 
In the instant case, the court below failed to 
determine the value of Defendant's retirement earned during 
the course of the marriage as required by Gardner. It was 
only "estimated" at trial that Defendant's retirement funds 
were valued at between $80,000.00 and $100,000.00. No 
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findings were made as to the present value of the vested and 
unvested stock options of Defendant, Similarly, no findings 
as to the vested and unvested annuity or as to the Social 
Security income to be available to Defendant were made. 
Normally, Plaintiff should have been awarded a value 
represented by retirement benefits times one half of the 
fraction represented by the years of the marriage over the 
years that Defendant earned the benefits. See Woodward, 656 
P.2d at 433-34. 
The lower court determined it an equitable division of 
responsibilities and rights to hold Defendant fully and not 
one half liable for the mortgage debt but to allow Defendant 
any and all proceeds from his retirement accounts earned 
during the marriage. 
Thus Plaintiff gives up all interest in accounts 
probably in excess of $100,000.00 in exchange for relief 
from one half of a $36,000.00 mortgage debt. (Defendant's 
Exhibit 15, 3-4). The lower court failed consider the result 
and to determine the monetary values in a "sufficiently 
detailed" manner as required by Gardner. Therefore the 
present case should be remanded for the appropriate 
calculations, and for the requisite reapportionment of 
property interests in Defendant's retirement accounts. 
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B. The trial court did not enter a qualified domestic 
order as requested by the Plaintiff and as proper under the 
facts of this case. 
29 U.S.C. §1056 et seq. outlines the procedure by which 
a domestic relations order may qualify a former spouse as 
alternate payee to certain of the accrued benefits before or 
upon the payee's retirement. See also, 26 U.S.C. §414(p). 
In her Complaint, Plaintiff requested that the court below 
enter a qualified domestic relations order for appropriate 
benefits in order to assure herself of a secure and 
dependable source of income in light of her severe and 
permanent mental and physical disabilities. 
Defendant has demonstrated his unwillingness to provide 
for Plaintiff in her disabled condition. The marriage 
survived as long as Plaintiff fully provided for herself 
financially while continuing to sustain the marriage 
emotionally and socially. In the latter years of the 
marriage, Plaintiff even bought her own trailer and lived 
separately so as to relieve tensions with stepchildren and 
so as to avoid violent confrontations with the Defendant. 
(Tr. 25). 
When the stepchildren problems began to diminish upon 
their gradual emancipation, Plaintiff again attempted to 
live with Defendant; but soon after her cataclysmic brain 
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damage, Defendant took her to file for divorce pro se to 
avoid expense. Defendant could not deal with being on the 
giving end of the relationship even during her period of 
disability. See supra at 7. 
Since the divorce, Plaintiff has had to return to court 
on an Order to Show Cause because Defendant did not pay 
court ordered alimony and health insurance premiums. See 
supra at 5. 
Thus a qualified domestic relations order would aid 
Plaintiff by making her a direct payee of benefits to which 
she is entitled. She would not have to d€>pend upon 
Defendant totally in order to receive necessary funds. 
Therefore the case should be remanded for a proper 
determination of those benefits whether vested or not vested 
which are appropriately distributed through a qualified 
domestic relations order. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons outlined above, the trial court's 
awards of alimony and health insurance should be affirmed. 
The case should be remanded for the limited purpose of 
valuation and distribution of property, with provision for 
entering a qualified domestic relations order if appropriate 
under the facts adduced on remand. 
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DATED t h i s 
Respec t fu l ly su tani t ted , 
day . 1991, 
^QO 
UTAH(LEGAL7 SERVICES, Inc. 
By Jerri^Hill 
Attorney for Appellant-Cross-Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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hereby certify that on the /y" day of March, 1991, I 
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ROBERT M. McCRAE, Attorney at Law 
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ALEXANDER v. A L E X A W D E R 
Cite M 737 P.2d 221 (Uuh 1987) 
any work stoppage caused by a strike de- ited by law. American 
Utah 221 
prives the workers of benefits. When the 
employer violates the labor laws, the state 
will subsidize the subsequent strike, even 
though the strike stops all work. 
The employees argue that they qualify 
for this exception because the strike was 
caused by Greyhound's violation of federal 
labor laws. The employees cite a variety 
of company activities which they believe 
are unfair labor practices under section 8(a) 
of the National Labor Relations Act,1-?-in-
cluding threats of loss of employment or 
benefits, picket line surveillance, and cir-
cumvention of the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
[7] Greyhound disputes this claim in 
three ways. It first argues that the unfair 
labor provisions relied on by claimants are 
not laws "pertaining to hours, wages, or 
other conditions of work," as those terms 
are used in section 35-4-5(dXl) of the Code, 
and that those are the only violations that 
can trigger the operation of that section. 
Second, Greyhound contends that even ifx 
claimants' alleged violations do fall within 
section 35-4-5(dXl), the National Labor Re-
lations Board has exclusive and preemptive 
jurisdiction to decide whether an employer 
has committed an unfair labor practice un-
der federal law. Lastly, Greyhound argues 
that it did not, in fact, commit the alleged 
unfair labor practices. We find that the 
alleged violations do not relate to "hours, 
wages, or other conditions of work"; there-
fore, we need not reach Greyhound's sec-
ond and third contentions. 
[8] Most of Greyhound's alleged labor 
law violations pertain to the bargaining 
process. Only the alleged imposition of 
Greyhound's October 31st offer with a re-
troactivity provision could be said to direct-
ly affect wages, hours, or conditions of 
work. The employer's implementation of 
its proposals after negotiations have 
reached an impasse, however, is not prohib-
i t Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations 
Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982), pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for 
an employer— 
Federation of 
Television & Radio Artists v. N.LR.B., 
395 F.2d 622, 624 (D.C.Cir.1968). We 
therefore conclude that section 35-4-5(dXl) 
has not been triggered here. 
In this case, Greyhound suffered a work 
stoppage that existed because of a strike. 
The strike was not a result of Greyhound's 
nonconformance with the law, but was a 
voluntary action taken by the employees in 
the course of negotiating a new contract. 
The decision of the Board is therefore af-
firmed. 
HALL, CJ., STEWART, Associate 
CJ., and HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., 
concur. 
KEY NUMBH SYSTIM3 
Stephen Norris ALEXANDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Diane Jean ALEXANDER, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 20841. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 28, 1987. 
Decree of divorce was entered in the 
District Court, Second Judicial District, 
Douglas L. Cornaby, J., and husband ap-
PealecL The Supreme Court, Durham, J.,' 
held that (1) awarding custody of young-
est child to wife, thereby separating young-
est child from three older siblings, who 
lived with husband, was not abuse of trial 
court's discretion; (2) refusal to reduce val-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Section 157 of this title; 
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees, subject to 
the provisions of Section 159(a) of this title. 
. oi nusoana s profit-sharing plan to ac-
count for income tax liability that could be 
imposed in future was not abuse of trial 
court's discretion; and (3) including in e q -
uation of marital estate contributions hus-
band madeto profit-sharing plan after wife 
left marital home but before marriage was 
terminated was not abuse of trial court's 
discretion. 
Affirmed. 
Howe, J., filed concurring opinion. 
1. Divorce «=»301 
Task of determining best interest of 
child in custody dispute was for trial judge, 
who had opportunity to personally observe 
and evaluate witnesses. 
2. Infants <®=>19.3(7) 
Custody determination of trial judge 
will not be overruled where trial judge 
exercised his discretion in accord with stan-
dards set by Supreme Court 
3. Divorce <s»301 
Evidence that wife had been primary 
care-giver for youngest child and planned 
to live with child's grandmother in situation 
in which grandmother would share child-
care duties and evidence suggesting that 
husband ran a dirty, disorganized house-
hold and had no firm plans for care of child 
while he worked were sufficient to support 
award of custody of youngest child to wife. 
4. Divorce <3=*298(4) 
Fact that wife had abandoned husband 
did not preclude trial court from awarding 
custody of youngest child to wife in divorce 
action. U.C.A.1953, 30-2-10. 
5. Divorce <s=>296 
Awarding custody of youngest child to 
wife, thereby separating youngest child 
from three older siblings, who lived with 
husband, was not abuse of trial court's 
discretion in divorce action; there was ten 
and one-half-year gap between parties' last 
two children, wife was primary care-giver 
for youngest child and there was evidence 
that husband was unable to provide home 
environment suitable for youngest child. 
tJ. Parent and Child *=»2(3) 
Maternal preference is impermissible 
in custody proceeding. 
7. Divorce s=>298(l) 
Isolated statement by trial judge, to 
effect that wife lost custody of three older 
children when she left marital home, was 
insufficient to show that award of custody 
of youngest child to wife was based on 
improper maternal preference. 
8. Divorce «=*252.4 
Property division which required hus-
band to pay marital debts was not abuse of 
trial court's discretion in divorcE-adaon. 
9. Divorce <s=>253(3) 
Trial court's refusal to reduce present 
value of husband's profit-sharing plan to 
account for income tax liability that couKT 
bejmposed in the future was not abuse of 
trial court's discretion in determining prop-
erty division in divorce action. 
10. Divorce e=»252.3(4) 
Including contribution husband made 
to profit-sharing plan after wife left mari-
jgl home but before marriage was termi-
nated was not abuse of trial court's discre-
tion in valuing marital estate in divorce 
action. 
William H. Lindsley, for plaintiff and ap-
pellant 
James B. Hanks, for defendant and re-
spondent. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Plaintiff Stephen Norris Alexander ap-
peals from a decree of divorce awarding 
defendant Diane Jean Alexander custody 
of their youngest child. 
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 
Arizona in 1968. At the time of the mar-
'riage, defendant was sixteen years old and 
pregnant. The parties had two more chil-
dren within the first three and a half years 
of their marriage, making defendant the 
mother of three preschoolers at the age of 
nineteen. After a ten and a half-year hia-
tus, the parties' fourth and final child was 
born. 
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[5] Plaintiffs claim that it was improp-
er to separate the children is likewise with-
out merit "While it is true that a child 
custody award which keeps all the children 
of the marriage united is generally pre-
ferred to one which divides them between 
the parents, that preference is not binding 
on the face of considerations dictating a 
contrary course of action." Jorgensen v. 
Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510, 512 (Utah 1979); 
see also Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 
(Utah 1986). In this case, we think the ten 
and a half-year gap between the parties' 
last two children, defendant's role as pri-
mary care-giver, and plaintiffs inability to 
provide a home environment suitable for a 
young child are considerations that were 
properly used to award defendant custody 
of the youngest child. We find no abuse of 
discretion. 
[6,7] Plaintiff also asserts that the trial 
court was motivated by an improper prefer-
ence for the mother because of the age of 
the youngest child. We agree with plain-
tiff that a maternal preference is impermis-
sible. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 
1986). Plaintiff, however, has offered us 
no proof that such a preference operated 
here. As support for his claim, he cites 
only an isolated statement by the trial 
judge to the effect that defendant lost cus-
tody of the three older children when she 
left the marital home. Plaintiff asks us to 
reach too far to move from this remark to 
the conclusion that the trial court exercised 
an improper maternal preference. 
Property Division 
The trial court awarded defendant, who 
has only a tenth-grade education, no alimo-
ny, but gave her half of the marital estate 
and ordered plaintiff to pay the couple's 
outstanding debts in lieu of alimony. Nei- j 
ther party was awarded child support 
Plaintiff claims that it was error for the! 
trial court to order him to pay the marital 
debts and argues that the trial court erred 
in failing to reduce the value of a stock-
price-tied profit-sharing plan to account for 
tax liability and in including post-separa-
tion contributions to the plan in assessing 
its value. We find no error. 
18] As long as a property division is 
made within the standards set by this 
Court, we will not disturb the trial judge's 
decision. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074; 
Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 781, 782 
(Utah 1986). We find the property division 
made by the trial court to be well within its 
discretion. 
This Court endows the court's adjust-
ment of the financial interests of the 
parties with a presumption of validity 
and does not review their values absent a 
clear abuse of discretion We do not 
lightly disturb property divisions made 
by the trial court and uphold its decision 
except where to do so would work a 
manifest injustice or inequity. 
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d at 119 (citations 
omitted); see Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 
1201 (Utah 1983). 
[9,10] We also decline to disturb the 
trial court's valuation of the profit-sharing 
plan. The trial court did not reduce the 
present value of the plan to account for 
income tax liability that could be imposed 
in the future. Plaintiff has not argued and 
it does not appear that the valuation of the 
profit-sharing plan was itself a taxable 
event; therefore, we do not think the trial 
court's refusal to speculate about hypothet-
ical future consequences was an abuse of 
discretion. See Gilbert v. Gilbert,.S2& P.2d 
1088, 1089 (Mont.1981) (affirming a proper-
ty division in which the trial judge did not 
adjust the market value of a retirement 
account in anticipation of future tax liabili-
ty). Plaintiff argues that contributions he 
made to the profit-sharing plan after de-
fendant left the marital home but before 
the marriage was terminated 
have been included in the mai 
a 
We disagree. Under appropriate c u ^ n ^ 
stances, the trial court isTwitH5nts^discrer 
v-
tion in evaluating the marital estate as of 1 
the_date the marriage is terminated. Jes-_ 
'person v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 
(Utah 1980). 
""iGfirmed. Costs to respondent 
HALL, CJ., STEWART, Associate 
CJ., and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur. 
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a somewhat similar instruction was harm-
less error. Furthermore, the property sto-
len was not fungible property which de-
fendant might have legitimately possessed. 
Rather, the checks were identified as prop-
erty belonging to others were shown to 
have been forged and would not legitimate-
ly have been in his possession under any 
circumstances. 
Affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., concurs. 
DURHAM, Justice (concurring 
separately): 
I concur in the majority opinion, but 
write separately to emphasize the obli-
gation of defense counsel to notify judges 
who have ruled on pretrial suppression is-
sues that defendants' objections to chal-
lenged evidence are reserved and not with-
drawn, thus alerting those judges to the 
possibility that trial evidence may affect 
the validity of earlier rulings. I agree that 
in this case there was an extensive hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress, and it is 
quite clear from the record that defense 
counsel did not intend to waive any related 
evidentiary objections at trial. In fact, sev-
eral ambiguous references during trial to a 
"prior motion" may have referred to de-
fendant's pretrial motion to suppress. It is 
important, however, that trial judges be 
given the opportunity to review pretrial 
suppression rulings when and if there is 
any likelihood that they were erroneous. 
When the pretrial judge is also the trial 
judge, unlike the circumstance in State v. 
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), this is 
easily accomplished by indicating on the 
record, either at the end of the pretrial 
hearing or at the trial outside the presence 
of the jury, that there is a continuing objec-
tion to the evidence challenged in the mo-
tion to suppress. 
HOWE, and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur in the concurring opinion of 
DURHAM, J. 
Betty M. GARDNER, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
William James GARDNER, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 19246. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Jan. 4, 1988. 
Divorce decree was entered by the Sec-
ond District Court, Weber County, Ronald 
0. Hyde, J., and wife appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Stewart, Associate C.J., held 
that: (1) trial court was required to value 
husband's retirement account; (2) wife was 
entitled to findings in support of denial of 
her request for portion of husband's medi-
cal assets; (3) regardless of whether evalu-
ation and distribution of a professional de-
gree or professional practice is ever appro-
priate, it was inappropriate in the present 
case where marriage was of long duration 
and present earnings and business assets 
provided a more accurate measure of the 
true worth of wife's investment in hus-
band's degree; and (4) alimony award was 
insufficient and inequitable. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, J., filed opinion concurring and 
dissenting. 
1. Divorce <*=>286(5) 
Though the Supreme Court may modi-
fy decisions of trial court, trialjgour£sjiP' 
portionment of maritalj)rope^^ 
SsSrbeTunless it is clearly unjugtjgL^ 
clear abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce «=»252.3(4) 
Marital property includes pension fund 
or insurance, but dividing retirement o 
pension funds is not necessarily consisten 
with principles of equitable distribution tf 
all cases, and providing for payments wn 
GARDNER v. GARDNER Utah 1077 
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>ayout begins should be employed only in would qualify for social security payments 
are instances. only as an "ex-wife married over 20 years." 
L Divorce <S=>252.3(4) 
Trial court, in apportioning marital 
property upon divorce, was required to at 
east consider the value of the husband's 
etirement account, and alternatives avail-
able for taking that value into account 
yould include requiring husband to pay 
iklf of net present value to wife in annual 
nstallmentSj or reapportioning proplsrty 
listribution to offset that value. 
«» • ' — — -
Divorce <£=>253(4) 
Wife was entitled to finding in support 
>£denial of her request for a portion of the 
Lgsets of husband's medical assets, and it 
gaS error to refuse to place present value 
Hereon on the ground that the assets were 
tfntnristic." 
>£ Divorce <3=>252.3(1) 
|j£ Goodwill is properly subject to eq-
iitable distribution upon divorce. 
i. Divorce <3=>252.3(1) 
£1 Regardless of whether professional de-
cree and professional practice may in ap-
propriate cases constitute marital property 
robject to evaluation and distribution upon 
iivorce, wife's request for property inter-
est in husband's medical degree was inap-
propriate where the marriage was of long 
Juration and present earnings and business 
assets provided a more accurate measure 
jrfLthe true worth of the wife's investment 
b^her husband's degree. 
/yiivorce <s»237 
llfc^Alimony award should, after marriage 
g|.long duration and to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective standards 
^living and maintain them at a level as 
j|fee as possible to the standard of living 
Sjpyed during the marriage. 
^Divorce <*=»240(2) 
_ Alimony award of $1,200 per month 
Bgff husband's retirement and $600 per 
j&Sj!1 thereafter was an abuse of discre-
j^^where husband was a physician with 
ggfogs of $6,000 per month, wife had not 
Mmployed for 30 years, husband had 
stantial retirement assets, and wife 
9. Divorce <3=»225 
There was no error in divorce case in 
failing to award attorney fees to wife, 
where portion of property award was for 
purpose of assisting wife to pay attorney 
and no showing was made in trial as to the 
nature and amount of fees. 
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
C. Gerald Parker, Ogden, for defendant 
and respondent. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Betty Gardner appeals from a 
decree awarding alimony and attorney fees 
in a divorce action she brought against her 
former husband, William Gardner. We re-
verse and remand for further considera-
tion. 
Mr. and Mrs. Gardner were married at 
Steels Tavern, Virginia, on April 17, 1950. 
No children were born to them, but the 
couple adopted two children who are now 
both adults. Early in the marriage, Mrs. 
Gardner worked full-time as a secretary 
while Mr. Gardner completed his medical 
training. Mr. Gardner also worked various 
jobs, and his parents provided support in 
the form of medical school tuition. Mrs. 
Gardner has not worked since 1958, when 
Mr. Gardner completed his medical train-
ing. Mr. Gardner is now employed as a 
general surgeon, earning $6,000 per month. 
While married, Mr. and Mrs. Gardner 
acquired substantial real and personal 
property. Their major asset was a farm, 
including a home and equipment located 
near Eden, Utah, worth between $246,000 
and $280,000. Other assets included Mr. 
Gardner's medical assets and retirement 
funds with an uncertain valuation of be-
tween $73,000 and $177.000; a contract for 
the sale of stock in the Ogden Clinic Invest-
ment Company; a certificate of deposit; 
household furniture, furnishings and fix-
tures; boats and automobiles; sporting 
equipment; and two horses and associated 
equipment At the time of divorce, the 
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couple's only outstanding debts were a 
first mortgage on the family home and a 
loan for the purchase of one automobile. 
The trial court ordered that the farm, 
home, and equipment be sold and the pro-
ceeds be divided equally. Until the farm 
was sold, Mrs. Gardner was entitled to its 
use, although she had to pay the mortgage, 
taxes, and insurance. The court also or-
dered that the motor vehicles and boats be 
sold and the proceeds divided equally, with 
the exception of one personal automobile 
for each party. The household furnishings 
and other items of personal property were 
divided roughly equally, according to per-
sonal need. Mr. Gardner was awarded his 
medical and business assets, including re-
tirement funds, except Mrs. Gardner was 
awarded one-third of the proceeds from the 
sale of the Old Ogden Clinic building to pay 
her attorney fees. They were to share 
equally a money market certificate. The 
court granted Mrs. Gardner $1,200 per 
month alimony, to be reduced to $600 per 
month following Mr. Gardner's retirement. 
Mrs. Gardner was also to have a claim for„ 
$50f000 against Mr. Gardner's estate in the 
event that he predeceased her. 
Mrs. Gardner asks this Court to reverse 
the judgment of the lower court. She cites 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1982), for the proposition that she 
has a spousal right to an equitable distribu-
tion of Mr. Gardner's retirement funds. 
She also asserts a property interest in his 
medical degree and business and claims 
that the alimony award was insufficient. 
Finally, she asks this Court for an award of 
attorney fees. 
In a divorce proceeding, the trial 
court should make a distribution of proper-
ty and income so that the parties may 
readjust their lives to their new circum-
stances as well as possible. Turner v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982); Mac-
Donald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 
P.2d 1066 (1951). Although this Court may 
modify decisions of the trial court, its ap-
portionment of marital property will not be 
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust or a 
clear abuse of discretion. Turner, 649 
P.2d at 8. 
The trial court awarded Mr. Gardner his 
retirement account and medical assets 
without placing a present value on any of 
those assets. The trial court called both 
those types of assets "futuristic" and indi-
cated that their value would be utilized at 
retirement. The court did not attempt to 
resolve the differing valuations of the as-
sets and provided little explanation for the 
award to Mr. Gardner. 
Recently, in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987), we noted: * ' 
Failure of the trial court to make find-
ings on all material issuesTiTreversfolft 
error unless the facts in the record arp 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capabfc of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
iudgment." Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). . . . The find-
ings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree "follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence." 
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 
1986). The findings "should be suffi-
ciently detailed and include enough sub-
sidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached." Rucker [v. 
Dalton], 598 P.2d [1336] at 1338 [Utah 
1979]. See also Mountain States Legal 
Foundation v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 636 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Utah 1981). 
The trial court's statement in its findings 
that the retirement account and Mr. Gard-
ner's medical assets are "futuristic" was 
apparently intended to mean that they 
could not be given a present value or 
should not for other reasons be taken into 
account. That, however, does not follow 
from the evidence presented at trial, nor is 
it supported by our cases. R?g?^!^L2i 
how remote the full value of an assetjs^jt 
still has present value. The testimony ad-
duced aftrial devote to differing valua-
tions by the parties merited more precise 
findings. 
(fi^ In Woodward u Woodward, 656 
P.2d at 432, we^ecognized that retirement 
benefits, whe~tKer vested or nojLar£jjJgg 
of deferred compensation whichj^jgg!: 
jtal assets. A right to deferred compensa-
GARDNER 
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tion acquired during marriage, or that por-
tion of one's right to deferred compensa-
tion acquired during marriage, should not 
be^  entirely ignored in dividing assets, irre-
spective of when the vested funds are pay-
able. Thus, marital property "encompass-
es all of the assets of every nature pos-
sessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived; and 
this includes any such pension fund or in-
surance.0 Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 
1274 (Utah 1978). 
However, an award of a part of a 
spouse's retirement funds may create sig-
nificant problems. In some instances, mar-
ital assets are sparse, income is low, and an 
award of an equitable share of retirement 
assets might work a substantial hardship. 
Courts have, however, awarded the value 
of the assets on a periodic payment plan 
and, in some instances, have provided for 
payments when payout begins. This alter-
native should be employed only in rare 
instances. In Woodward, the Court stated: 
Long-term and deferred sharing of finan-
cial interests are obviously too suscepti-
ble to continued strife and hostility, cir-
cumstances which our courts traditional-
ly strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible 
. . . fW]here other assets for equitable 
^jrftutjon are inadequate or lacking al-
v. GARDNER Utah 1079 
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accomplished when necessary. For exam-
ple, in Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 
(Utah App.1987), a physician was required 
to pay one-half the net present value of his 
retirement plan, $56,850, to his former wife 
in five annual installments. The court 
awarded present value of the share to be 
paid within five years to avoid "leaving the 
parties in a 'financial entanglement that 
would continue for approximately twenty 
or thirty years and would probably result 
in further court hearings and cause future 
animosity between the parties/" Id. at 
241-42. Rayburn provides a possible al-
ternative for dealing with the value of the 
retirement account in this case. Because 
of the sizeable assets in this case, another 
alternative would be reapportionment of 
the property distribution to offset the value 
of the retirement account. 
In any event, it will be necessary on 
remand to determine the value of the re-
tirement account. The account has a 
present value of between $73T00Q and 
$177,000, and the Court should at least 
{-
together, or where no present value can 
be established and the parties are unable 
/ -
to reach agreement, resort must be had 
to a form of deferred distribution based 
wupon fixed percentages. 
>56 P.2d at 433 (quoting Kxkkert v. Kik-
tert, 177 NJ.Super. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76, 
T9-80 (1981)). 
Obviously, dividing retirement or pension 
funds is not necessarily consistent with 
principles of equitable distribution in all 
awes. The purpose of divorce is to end 
narriage and allow the parties to make as 
auch of a clean break from each other as 
s reasonably possible. An award of de-
ferred compensation which ties a couple 
together long after divorce can frustrate 
that objective. 
g|3j) Nevertheless, the division of retire-
ment funds between two persons can be 
consider the value of the account in making 
the property distribution. 
Another alternative for the apportion-
ment of property lies in the trial court's 
discretion to award the entire value of a 
solely owned professional corporation to 
the husband. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1208 
(Utah 1982). In Dogu, the earning power 
of the corporation resulted entirely from 
Dr. Dogu's continuing ability to work; 
however, there were questions as to his 
ability to do so. The trial court awarded 
the wife savings certificates, bank ac-
counts, and stock to offset the present liq-
uid assets of the corporation (accounts re-
ceivable and bank accounts). The trial 
court did not attempt to value the future 
earnings potential of the corporation, pre-
sumably because of questions regarding 
the ability of Dr. Dogu to continue to gen-
erate income for the corporation. 
[4,5] The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr. 
Gardner is a member, is a well-entrenched 
institution, whose twenty-three members 
have banded together in a business orga-
nization. It is not likely to be highly sus-
ceptible to earnings interruptions because 
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of the ill health of one of its members. 
The Ogden Clinic is not entirely valueless. 
Mr. Gardner's share, using his own figures, 
is worth at least $3,826 (partnership $3,726, 
corporation $100). Mrs. Gardner's account-
ants value the business much higher. Nei-
ther gave consideration to the good will 
inherent in the professional clinic.1 Mrs. 
Gardner was entitled to findings in support 
of the denial of her request for a portion of 
those assets. Instead, the trial court dis-
posed of the medical assets in the same 
sentence in which it disposed of the retire-
ment account. 
The medical assets at issue here were not 
included in the retirement account, but the 
trial court seems to have assumed that 
they were one and the same. In any event, 
no findings of fact were made as to the 
value of the medical assets. The award to 
Mr. Gardner of his retirement funds and 
medical assets may be proper and eq-
uitable. However, we cannot adequately 
review the trial court's determinations on 
the basis of the sparse findings before us. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a 
valuation of the medical assets and retire-
ment accounts and reconsideration of the 
distribution of the marital property on the 
basis of those findings. 
In addition, Mrs. Gardner assets an eq-
uitable and legal property interest in the 
medical degree of her former spouse. 
Whether professional degrees and profes-
sional practice constitute marital property 
subject to valuation and distribution upon 
the dissolution of a marriage has been the 
subject of much debate in recent years, 
especially in the wake of decisions where 
such a valuation has been made. See, e.g., 
Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 
1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N J . 488, 
1. A marriage may be analogized to a partner-
ship. Upon dissolution of the marital "partner-
ship," an equitable distribution should be based 
on consideration of all assets, not just those that 
survive the trip to the bottom of the balance 
sheet. Where appropriate, value may be given 
to that "something in business which gives rea-
sonable expectancy of preference in the race of 
competition," commonly known as good will. 
Jackson v. Caldwell 18 Utah 2d 81, 85, 415 P.2d 
667, 670 (1966). 
The ability of a business to generate income 
from its continued patronage is commonly re-
453 A.2d 527 (1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 
66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E. 
2d 712 (1985). It has similarly been the 
subject of discussion in our Court of Ap-
peals. See Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 
238 (Utah App.1987); Petersen v. Petersen, 
737 P.2d 237 (Utah App.1987). 
One authority has argued that education-
al achievements are susceptible to valua-
tion,2 but there is judicial authority for the 
proposition that the value of an education 
does not fall within the common under-
standing of the concept of property: 
An educational degree, such as an 
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even 
by the broad views of the concept of 
"property." It does not have an ex-
change value or any objective transfer-
able value on an open market. It is 
personal to the holder. It terminates on 
death of the holder and is not inheritable. 
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, 
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced de-
gree is a cumulative product of many 
years of previous education, combined 
with diligence and hard work. It may 
not be acquired by the mere expenditure 
of money. It is simply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially assist 
in the future acquisition of property. In 
our view, it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that term. 
In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 
432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). See also Maho-
ney, 91 NJ. 488 at 496, 453 A.2d 527 at 
531. 
The cases which have refused to hold 
that professional degrees and practice con-
stitute marital property subject to valua-
tion and distribution have nonetheless as-
sessed and divided the value of the degree 
ferred to as good will. Good will is properly 
subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. 
See, e,g.t Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 457 A.2d 
1 (1983); Matter of Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash. 
2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). But see The 
Treatment of Good Will in Divorce Proceedings, 
18 Fam.L.Q. 213 (1984). 
2. See Fitzpatrick & Doucette, Can the Economic 
Value of an Education Really Be Measured?, 21 
J.Fam.L. 51 (1983). 
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or practice on the basis of other legal and 
equitable remedies. These cases follow a 
common fact pattern. Typically, the hus-
band is supported throughout a long gradu-
ate or professional program by the working 
wife, and the couple is divorced soon after 
graduation. In such cases, there are few 
marital assets to distribute, and the courts 
have considered other ways of compensat-
ing the spouse. In a limited number of 
cases, the courts focus on the educational 
degree or professional practice. See gener-
ally In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Mahoney, 91 N.J. 
488, 453 A.2d 527; Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847; 
O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 
489 N.E.2d 712; and Hubbard v. Hubbard, 
603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979), for various theo-
ries of valuation. 
[6] We agree that an educational or 
professional degree is difficult to value and 
that such a valuation does not easily fit the 
common understanding of the character of 
property. However, at least in the present 
instance, we need not reach the question of 
whether such a valuation may ever take 
place. Sufficient assets distinguish this 
case from others in which equity and fair-
ness required another solution. Where, as 
here, the marriage is of long duration, 
present earnings and business assets pro-
vide a more accurate measure of the true 
worth of the wife's investment in her hus-
band's degree. The home, farm, automo-
biles, and other assets of approximately 
$500,000 allow for a divisible award be-
tween the Gardners. In a sense, Mrs. 
Gardner has realized benefits from the 
medical degree in the form of a greater 
property settlement and higher alimony. 
We find Mrs. Gardner's request for a prop-
erty interest in Mr. Gardner's medical de-
gree inappropriate under these facts and 
affirm the findings of the trial court in this 
regard. 
[7,8] Mrs. Gardner also claims the trial 
court's award of alimony was insufficient 
and inequitable. We agree. An alimony 
award should, after a marriage such as this 
and to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possi-
v. GARDNER Utah 1081 
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ble to that standard of living enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Higley v. Higley, 
676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983). In Jones, 
we enumerated three factors important in 
fixing an alimony award: (1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the wife; (2) the 
ability of the wife to produce sufficient 
income for herself; and (3) the ability of 
the husband to provide support. Jones, 
700 P.2d at 1075. See also English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1977). 
Mrs. Gardner has not been gainfully em-
ployed since 1958. Though testimony indi-
cated that she was skilled as an executive 
secretary, it will be difficult for her to 
regain these skills and become reemployed 
after a thirty-year absence. Mr. Gardner, 
by contrast, retains his career as a physi-
cian with earnings of $6,000 per month. 
The trial court awarded Mrs. Gardner 
$1,200 per month as alimony, to be reduced 
to $600 per month following Mr Gardner's 
retirement. The court provided no expla-
nation of the basis for the preretirement 
award and stated that the reduction in ali-
mony following Mr. Gardner's retirement 
reflected a drop in his earning potential, 
Mrs. Gardner's eligibility for social securi-
ty, and the fact that the house would be 
sold, providing Mrs. Gardner with liquid 
assets. We think that this award was an 
abuse of discretion. 
Mrs. Gardner executed an affidavit prior 
to trial listing her monthly expenses at 
$1,700 per month. The trial court appar-
ently relied on testimony at the hearing 
and on a prior affidavit which set her 
monthly needs at $1,200. Mrs. Gardner is 
not employed and has little prospect of 
being reemployed. Viewing her future 
earning potential and current monthly ex-
penses, however arrived at, against that of 
Mr. Gardner's, we think it is clear that the 
award is insufficient to equalize the par-
ties' standards of living. 
Similarly, the trial court's award of $600 
monthly alimony following Mr. Gardner's 
retirement is also unreasonably low. Mr. 
Gardner has substantial retirement assets. 
Should Mr. Gardner reach retirement age, 
these assets will have increased substan-
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tially. Mrs. Gardner, however, has no pen-
sion and will qualify for social security 
payments only as an "ex-wife married over 
20 years." She will not qualify for regular 
social security benefits- until she has 
worked another thirty-nine quarters. Be-
cause the likelihood of her providing for 
her own retirement is small, we find that 
the trial court's award is insufficient to 
equalize the parties' standards of living 
following Mr. Gardner's retirement. 
We reverse and remand for further pro-
ceedings in light of the above and in light 
of the factors enumerated in Jones, 700 
P.2d at 1075. On remand, the trial court 
must evaluate the wife's ability to support 
herself based on findings and conclusions 
under the standards stated in Acton v. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996. It is not clear from 
the record before us that Mrs. Gardner will 
be able to meet her monthly needs either 
before or after Mr. Gardner's retirement, 
and this is the focus of our concern. Our 
review of the record therefore indicates 
that the alimony award may have to be 
increased. However, explicit findings 
based on the factors in Jones are needed to 
support that conclusion. 
[9] Finally, Mrs. Gardner asks this 
Court to make an award of attorney fees. 
The trial court made no specific award of 
attorney fees. However, in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, the trial court 
made clear that an award of a one-third 
interest in the Old Ogden Clinic building 
account and the division of the money mar-
ket certificate was for the purpose of as-
sisting the wife to pay her attorney. Mr. 
Gardner correctly notes that a request for 
attorney fees must be accompanied by evi-
dence at trial as to the nature and amount 
of such fees. See Warren v. Warren, 655 
P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1982). No such show-
ing was made at trial, and the findings do 
not support Mrs. Gardner's request Inso-
far as we have approved the property set-
tlement of the lower court, the award of 
attorney fees made part of that settlement 
is affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur in the majority opinion except in 
that part dealing with alimony. As to that 
part, I dissent for the following reasons. 
First, in reversing and remanding for a 
valuation of the medical and retirement 
assets and a redistribution of marital prop-
erty on the basis of those findings, Mrs. 
Gardner's financial position will undoubted-
ly improve and her income increase. This 
increase will have a direct bearing on the 
amount of alimony which she should be 
awarded. It is premature for us to now 
hold that the $1,200 per month or the $600 
per month awarded by the trial court is 
inadequate. It may well be that after the 
redistribution of property is made, the 
amounts awarded will be entirely fair and 
could even be excessive. This is especially 
true as to $600 alimony after Mr. Gardner's 
retirement. Any amount of his retirement 
awarded to her on remand decreases her 
need for alimony and his ability to pay it. 
The trial judge recognized this reality when 
he wrote in his memorandum decision: 
Upon his retirement, the alimony shall 
reduce to $600 per month. The reasons 
for this reduction are: by the time of 
retirement, the home should be sold and 
the plaintiff should have liquid assets; 
defendant's income will materially de-
crease; plaintiff will also receive some 
social security benefits. It is my intent 
in awarding to the defendant his medical 
assets and retirement assets that alimo-
ny shall be paid therefrom and that the 
plaintiff shall have a claim thereon as 
against the defendant's estate if he 
should predecease her. This claim shall 
be in the amount of $50,000. 
Second, the $l,700-per-month alimony re-
quested by Mrs. Gardner was based on her 
affidavit which listed her monthly needs at 
that amount, but based on her assumption 
that the court would allow her to continue 
to live on the twenty-one-acre country es-
tate of the parties on which is a six-bed-
room home with garages for four cars, a 
barn, and other outbuildings. Consequent-
ly, in arriving at her $l,700-per-month re-
quest, she included the monthly mortgage 
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payment, the property taxes, insurance pre-
miums on that property, monthly utilities 
on that property, and amounts for the care 
of the farm animals and for farm, garden, 
and house maintenance and repairs. How-
ever, the trial court did not award her the 
country estate or allow her to permanently 
stay there, but ordered that the parties sell 
the property as soon as possible The ma-
jority opinion does not assail this determi-
nation. The sale of the property ordered 
try the court necessarily eliminated many of 
tKe monthly expenses which formed a basis 
for the $1,700 alimony request. The trial 
court, therefore, acted properly in exclud-
ing those items of expense in determining a 
reasonable amount of monthly alimony and 
presumably included instead the cost of 
Mrs. Gardner's living in smaller and less 
expensive quarters. On cross-examination, 
Mrs. Gardner admitted that her cost of 
living would be less if she did not live on 
the estate. Thus, the $1,200 awarded by 
the trial court was clearly within the range 
of the evidence before the court. The ma-
jority does not claim that $1,200 was 
"clearly erroneous" as rule 52, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, requires us to conclude 
before we may upset findings of fact by 
the trial court 
We have always accorded trial courts 
considerable latitude in fixing alimony. 
Yet here, the majority sweeps aside the 
trial court's judgment because it is only one-
fifth of Mr. Gardner's monthly income and 
is insufficient to "equalize the parties' stan-
dard of living." Insofar as this writer 
knows, reasonable and fair alimony has 
never been expressed as a percentage of 
the husband's monthly income. This is a 
new concept, completely foreign to the test 
recognized in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1985), for determining an alimony 
award. Since the monthly income of di-
vorced husbands is not all the same, the 
monthly needs and financial conditions of 
divorced wives vary widely, and debts and 
other factors have to be considered, per-
centages should not be employed or relied 
position of the parties after their divorce. 
Again, this concept is contrary to the three 
factors to be considered which we enumer-
ated in Janes v. Jones, supra: (1) the finan-
cial condition and needs of the wife, (2) the 
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient 
income for herself, and (3) the ability of the 
husband to provide support. We have said 
that the wife is entitled to enjoy as near as 
possible the same standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage and she 
should be prevented from becoming a pub-
lic charge. English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409, 411 (Utah 1977). But this is not the 
same as "equalizing" their incomes. The 
instant case is a good example. Mr. Gard-
ner is a highly skilled surgeon earning 
$6,000 per month. Mrs. Gardner was not 
employed at the time of the divorce. She 
thought she could maintain the standard of 
living to which she had become accustomed 
if she received $1,700 per month alimony. 
If their financial positions after divorce are 
to be equal, she presumably should have 
$3,000 per month alimony. I do not think 
the majority intends that result. 
The object of divorce is to set the parties 
free of each other after an equitable divi-
sion of property is made and, if needed, an 
award of alimony is made which will enable 
both parties to maintain as near as possible 
the standard of living they enjoyed during 
the marriage. The parties then go their 
separate ways and attempt to rebuild their 
lives. But because of the disparity in their 
earning ability, the wife here, who has 
training as a secretary but has not been 
employed for thirty-three years, will never 
earn as much as her husband-surgeon. 
Our cases do not suggest that the divorce 
decree should attempt to cure this disparity 
by "equalizing" their future incomes. 
EKYNUMMt SYSTEM, 
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Finally, I strongly dissent from the re-
peated references in the majority opinion 
that alimony is to "equalize" the financial 
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notated.9 
[4] Nowhere in the Utah Constitution 
or Utah Code Annotated does the legisla-
ture give the Tax Commission the unbri-
dled discretion to make findings of fact 
beyond the scope of what is presented in 
the hearings or inferences to be drawn 
therefrom. Although it is a "universally 
recognized rule" that this court must "take 
some cognizance of the expertise of the 
agency in its particular field and according-
ly to give some deference to its determina-
tion," ,0 the agency's decision must rest 
upon some sound evidentiary basis, not a 
creation of fiat.11 
[5] It is unclear from the record how 
the Tax Commission arrived at the figures 
it used in calculating the fair market value 
of petitioner's property. First National has 
upheld its burden to marshal all of the 
evidence in support of the Tax Commis-
sion's findings and has shown that on the 
record before us those findings are incon-
sistent with the evidence presented. 
We remand for the purpose of requiring 
the Tax Commission to more fully artic-
ulate the basis for its findings and determi-
nation of fair market value in light of the 
evidence presented in the hearing. 
within such limitations as the Legislature may 
prescribe, it shall review proposed bond is-
sues, revise the tax levies of local governmen-
tal units, and equalize the assessment and 
valuation of property within the counties 
The duties imposed upon the State Board of 
Equalization by the Constitution and Laws of 
this State shall be performed by the State Tax 
Commission. 
In each county of this State there shall be a 
County Board of Equalization consisting of 
the Board of County Commissioners of said 
county. The County Boards of Equalization 
shall adjust and equalize the valuation and 
assessment of the real and personal property 
within their respective counties, subject to 
such regulation and control by the State Tax 
Commission as may be prescribed by law. 
The State Tax Commission and the County 
Boards of Equalization shall each have such 
other powers as may be prescribed by the 
Legislature. 
9. Section 59-1-210 states in pertinent part. . 
The powers and duties of the commission are 
as follows: 
(7) to exercise supervision over assessors 
and county boards of equalization, and over 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and STEW 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
J 
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David BURT, Plaintiff and Appellg 
v. 
Betty Mae BURT, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890190-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
Oct. 12, 1990. 
Former spouses' property was" 
and alimony awarded to wife by ffiff 
decree entered in the Second *D] 
Court, Weber County, Stanton M . T | 
Wife appealed. The Court of*j 
Orme, J., held that: (1) property wffij 
other county officers in the j>erf< 
their duties relating to the assessmj 
erty and collection of taxes,-so'thai 
ments or property are just and equai 
ing to fair market value, and*;'* 
burden is distributed without ' jFi^ 
crimination, 
(23) to correct any error in an; 
made by it at any time befonjjj?1' 
and report the correction to " 
tor, who shall enter the correct 
upon the assessment roll; 
(2D; IO perform any further dtijj 
by law, and exercise all powers; 
the performance of its duties; 
(27) to comply with the procedj 
quirements of Chapter 46b/Tif' 
adjudicative proceedings. 
10. Utah Power <fc Light Co. v. S\ 
590 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979J 
11. Hurley v. Board of Review of\ 
767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988' 
Light, 590 P.2d at 335. 
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inherited, as well as its appreciated value, 
was wife's separate property; (2) trial 
court failed to enter specific findings on 
needs and condition of wife necessary to 
justify award of alimony; (3) value of par-
ties' retirement benefits were marital as-
sets, subject to equitable distribution upon 
divorce; and (4) wife was not entitled to 
award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
1. Divorce <s=>252.3(3) 
In property division incident to divorce, 
inherited or donated property, including its 
appreciated value, is generally separate 
from marital estate and hence is left with 
receiving spouse. 
2. Divorce ®=>252.3(3) 
Inherited or donated property may be 
part of marital estate, subject to division 
incident to divorce, if nonreceiving spouse 
augments, maintains, or protects property 
through his or her efforts, parties have 
inextricably commingled the property with 
marital property so that it has lost its sepa-
rate character, or the recipient spouse has 
contributed all or part of the property to 
the marital estate. 
3.' Divorce <e=>252.3(3) 
. j ^ Wife's inheritance maintained its sepa-
Jgtexharacter even though inherited funds 
Wd been substantially changed in form, 
"Where inheritance was readily traceable to 
segregated accounts, portfolios and real es-
tate. 
*• Divorce <s=>241, 252.3(3) 
In property division incident to divorce, 
i^nterest m inherited property to nonheir 
^Pouse may be awarded in lieu of alimony 
f* in other extraordinary situations where 
W % so demands. 
*• Divorce <s=>253(4) 
In property division incident to divorce, 
v. BURT 
166 (Utah App. 1990) 
6. Divorce <3=>237 
Utah 1167 
trial 
findi 
*hari 
»£ ---»-«• *w**i living w n u o u a n u a o an 
,
 e t
 to husband's putative interest in 
! ^ e Purchased by wife with separate in-
r ^ d funds. 
1
 court erred in not making sufficient 
mgs to justify decision awarding wife's 
^ in marital home to husband as an 
Gross disparity in income resulting 
from property division incident to divorce 
may be remedied by awarding alimony. 
7. Divorce «>237, 249.7 
While trial court should equitably ap-
portion property and calculate alimony pay-
ments, alimony may not be automatically 
awarded whenever there is a disparity be-
tween parties' incomes; where nearly all 
income at issue is simply return on proper-
ty interests, the trial court should first 
distribute property interest and only then 
consider need for alimony. 
8. Divorce <s=>231 
Alimony is appropriate to enable re-
ceiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as 
possible, standard of living enjoyed during 
marriage and to prevent spouse from be-
coming a public charge. 
9. Divorce <s=>239 
Trial court abused its discretion by 
awarding alimony without making specific 
^iindkigs-of fact on financial nccds-and con-
ditions of receiving ^pojuse^abjlity of re-
ceiving spouse to produce sufficient in-
come, and- resprondtrrg $po"useV ability to 
provide support. 
10. Divorce ®=>252.3(4) 
Retirement benefits which accrue dur-
ing marriage are marital assets subject to 
equitable distribution upon divorce. 
11. Divorce <3=>224 
Party who was awarded fees by trial 
court in divorce decree and prevails on ap-
peal generally will be awarded fees, and 
attorneys fees will generally not be award-
ed on appeal where trial court did not 
award fees below, except when party 
presents well-supported claim of changed 
circumstances. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
12. Costs <s=>260(5) 
Attorney fees may be awarded in ap-
peal from divorce decree where appeal is 
frivolous, regardless of trial court's ruling 
on fees. 
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13. Divorce <3=>225 
Attorney fees would not be awarded to 
wife on appeal where trial court did not 
award fees to wife and where wife made no 
showing of changed circumstances necessi-
tating an award. 
14. Divorce 0=^254(2) 
In property settlement incident to di-
vorce, trial court may award spouse share 
of income stream from vested retirement 
benefits as benefits are paid as a property 
award, not alimony, and thus award is not 
terminable upon remarriage. U.C.A.1953, 
30-3-5. 
15. Divorce <3=>252.2 
In division of property incident to di-
vorce, the overriding consideration is that 
ultimate division be equitable: that proper-
ty be fairly divided between parties, given 
their contributions during marriage and 
their circumstances at time of divorce. 
Pete N. Vlahos, F. Kim Walpole, Ogden, 
for defendant and appellant. 
John T. Caine, Ogden, for plaintiff and 
appellee. 
OPINION 
Before BENCH, GARFF, and ORME, 
JJ. 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant Betty Mae Burt appeals from 
the trial court's entry of a divorce decree, 
assigning error to the division of the par-
ties' marital property and the award to her 
of $300 per month as alimony. Defendant 
also seeks attorney fees and costs on ap-
peal. We reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff David Burt and defendant were 
married in 1947. Two children were born 
of the marriage, both of whom reached 
majority before the commencement of this 
action. At the time this action was filed, 
plaintiff had been retired from government 
employment since 1976 and was receivijl 
regular retirement payments of $1,350^ 
month. Plaintiff also received an additio2 
al $616 per month primarily from renlaj 
income and from a small watch repairiuiiij 
ness which produced nominal income^ml 
fendant received monthly income o£ $|y 
from Social Security, $185 from an Indivm 
ual Retirement Account, and $515 i^intel 
est and dividends from her investment 
The net disparity in monthly incomesfSj 
plaintiff and defendant amounts to $850d 
favor of plaintiff. ^^11 
While the disparity in income is m'favoi 
of plaintiff, an even more dramatic differ! 
ence in property exists in favor ofdefeff 
dant. Between 1969 and 1972, defenclaH 
received a total of $71,600 by inheritalpS 
Over the years she made various invest? 
ments and substantially increased herji9l<| 
ings, which amounted to at least $1747600 
by the time of trial, and even more accord 
ing to plaintiffs evidence. She purchased 
a home valued at $65,000, using investment 
income, in which she was living at the^ f—m 
of divorce. Early in the marriage, jhe 
ties jointly purchased a marital*hamg 
loan for which had been fully^satis| 
1973. Plaintiff was awardedftfA 
free of any claim by defendant 
The plaintiff was also awajg|?3 
fifty percent interest in an inherit^ 
which generated the rental incomgg 
to above. Plaintiff was allowedf 
his full retirement income and;,, 
tionally awarded savings account! 
$28,509. Plaintiff was, however 
to pay defendant $300 monthlyj 
On appeal, defendant£|pr , 
lenges the trial court's failure? 
sate her for her joint interest in\*tij|| 
home, suggesting the courtser 
garding the parties' home—aAma 
awarded solely to plaintiff—asr|a« 
offset against defendant's home, fM 
been purchased solely with ^ r ^ ^ 
funds. The defendant also ch|Ug~ 
court's failure to award her a'por 
plaintiffs government reuremeri 
acquired during the marriage)?ana 
vivor annuity benefits incident; 
1. The plaintiff jointly inherited the rental prop- erty with his brother. 
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She daims the ahmony awarded her in an 
effort to narrow the parties' income differ-
ential was not an adequate substitute for 
the retirement benefits to which she was 
entitled as a matter of property distribu-
tion. 
MARITAL HOME 
The trial court allowed plaintiff to retain 
the marital home without any claim against 
it by defendant. Defendant suggests the 
court erred in simplistically giving each 
party a home of equivalent value without 
regard to ownership—her house was really 
her house while "his" house was "theirs." 
However, the court's intended analysis was 
apparently that plaintiff was entitled to an 
equitable offset against the amounts which 
the defendant had been able to amass 
through investment of her inherited funds 
which, if not for the plaintiffs all but ex-
clusive payment of the mortgage and 
household expenses, even during the sub-
stantial period when both worked, would 
have been partially diverted, of necessity, 
towards those joint expenses. In making 
such an award the court, in effect, awarded 
a substantial portion of defendant's inherit-
ed funds to plaintiff. 
[1,2] Inherited or donated property,, as 
well as its appreciated value, is generally 
regarded as separate from the marital es-
tate and hence is left with the receiving 
spouse in a property division incident to 
divorce. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). However, such 
property may appropriately be considered 
part of the marital estate, subject to divi-
sion, when the other spouse has by his or 
her efforts augmented, maintained, or pro-
tected the inherited or donated property, 
id.; Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 
p
.2d 1380, 1381 (1973); where the parties 
nave inextricably commingled the property 
with marital property so that it has lost its 
separate character, Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 
308; or where the recipient spouse has 
z
- In the event the trial court does not find the 
situation warrants awarding the plaintiff some 
credit against defendant's inherited property, 
and plaintiff is required to part with a portion 
°f "his" retirement and buy out defendant's in-
contributed att or part of the property to 
the marital estate. Id. 
[3] Even though defendant's inheri-
tance is readily traceable and has not been 
commingled, plaintiff argues that defen-
dant's inherited funds have substantially 
changed in form—they were received as 
cash but have become stocks, bonds and 
real estate—and therefore they should be 
considered part of the marital estate. 
Plaintiff relies on Mortensen, wherein the 
Court stated that property which had lost 
its "identity through commingling or ex-
changes" could properly be considered part 
of the marital estate. 760 P.2d at 308. We 
disagree with plaintiffs reading of Morten-
sen. The thrust of Mortensen is not 
whether the mere form of property has 
changed, but whether it has lost its "identi-
ty" as separate property. Id. The sepa-
rate character of the defendant's inheri-
tance has been maintained in segregated 
accounts and portfolios and the home she 
purchased. Conversion from one invest-
ment medium to another does not, by itself, 
destroy the integrity of segregation. To 
accept plaintiffs view of Mortensen would 
unreasonably discourage the prudent in-
vestment of inherited funds. In order to 
preserve the property's separate character, 
the donee or heir would be required to 
maintain the property in the same physical 
form in which it was received, be it securi-
ties, real estate, or cash. The law does not 
require such economic absurdity. 
[4-6] Having so concluded, we none-
theless recognize that this precept does not 
place defendant's separate property totally 
beyond the court's reach in an equitable 
property division. The court may award an 
interest in the inherited property to the 
non-heir spouse m hen oi ahmony, Weaver 
v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P.2d 928, 
929 (1968)yor in "other extraordinary situa-
tions where equity so demands."2 Mor-
tensen, 760 P.2d at 308; see also, Naranjo 
v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. 
App.1988); Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830, 
terest in the marital home, the court may reme-
dy any gross disparity in income by an award of 
alimony to plaimiff. See Weaver, 442"P.2d at 
929; Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 
121, 124 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
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833 (Utah Ct.App.1987). However, we-
agree with defendant that the trial court 
did not make sufficient findings to justify 
its decision to award defendant's share in 
the marital home to plaintiff as an offset to 
plaintiffs putative interest in the home 
purchased by defendant with inherited 
funds. See, e.g., Throckmorton v. Throck-
morton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988) (trial court must make findings on all 
material issues); Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 
1147 (trial court must support its decision 
with adequate findings). Accordingly, 
without necessarily implying that the re-
sult was incorrect given the peculiar facts 
of this case, we must remand for further 
findings in support of the court's disposi-
tion of the marital home and the defen-
dant's separate property. 
, ALIMONY 
[7-9] The trial court granted defendant 
alimony in the amount of $300 per month in 
an attempt to help equalize the monthly 
income of the parties. While equity should 
be the watchword as the trial court appor-
tions property and calculates alimony pay-
ments, see Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987), alimony may 
not be automatically awarded whenever 
there is disparity between the parties' in-
comes.3 Alimony is appropriate "to enable 
the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly 
as possible the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage and to prevent the 
spouse from becoming a public charge." 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). 
A trial court must consider three factors 
in setting a reasonable award of alimony: 
3. It is questionable from the record that this is a 
case warranting alimony in favor of defendant, 
whose substantial accumulated wealth and 
monthly income should permit her a standard 
of living comparable to what she enjoyed during 
the marriage. Rather, alimony was the device 
the court selected to narrow the gap between 
the parties' incomes. Especially since nearly all 
income at issue in this case is simply the return 
on property interests, the court's approach was 
incorrect. Proper distribution of property inter-
ests of one sort or another should have come 
first, and only then would alimony need to be 
considered Defendant has conceded that the 
alimony award should be vacated if the marital 
1) the financial conditions an 
'
 X i
- "V.CV15 Of 
the receiving spouse; 2) the ability of tu 
receiving spouse to produce a sufficj^! 
income for him or herself; and 3) «* 
ability of the responding spouse to p^ v. 
vide support. 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 Pw 
121, 124 (Utah Ct.App.1988). The trt^ 
court failed to enter specific findings on 
the needs and condition of the defendant; 
prohibiting effective review of the alimony! 
award.4 We have held that the omission of1 
particular findings in alimony awards is ai$ 
abuse of discretion. Id.; Ruhsam v. Ruh-
sam, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah Ct.App.1987)? 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand fori 
further findings on the needs and condi^  
tions of both parties relative to alimony^ 
In conjunction with making adequate find*! 
ings as to the appropriate distribution of • 
inherited property in light of our discussion 
above, the court may then determine the 
propriety and amount of alimony for either 
party. 
RETIREMENT INCOME 
The trial court allowed the plaintiff to 
retain his full retirement benefits, which, 
like those of defendant that she was per-
mitted to retain in full, were accumulated 
during the marriage. These benefits had 
not only "vested" prior to the divorce—en-
titlement had ripened and regular distribu-
tions were being made. 
[10] Retirement benefits accrued dur-
ing marriage must normally be "considered 
a marital asset subject to equitable distri-
bution upon divorce." Motes v. Motes, 786 
P.2d 232, 234 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Greene 
property is properly divided. See also note 2, 
supra. 
4. But see note 3, supra. 
5. The court's general comment that the parties 
financial practices were "highly unusual" is not 
enough. 'This [c]ourt has consistently empha-
sized the importance of specific findings— 
Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988). This is particularly important in divorce 
actions. See Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331, 1333-34 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (findings 
must demonstrate that the court's decision logi-
cally follows from the evidence before it). 
BURT 
Cite as 799 P.2d 1 
v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah CtApp. 
1988). Here, the value of the parties' re-
tirement benefits may readily be calculated 
and equitably apportioned between the par-
ties as the court on remand reconsiders 
distribution of other marital assets.6 See 
Motes, 786 P.2d at 234. 
Defendant also seeks a share of the sur-
vivor annuity benefit incident to the plain-
tiffs government retirement benefit, which 
would provide continued income to defen-
dant upon plaintiffs death. On remand, 
the court may treat the annuity in a similar 
fashion to the retirement income stream, 
see note 8, infra, fixing a present value 
and considering that sum in the distribu-
tion scheme, or awarding the defendant an 
interest in the annuity to protect her right 
to continued payment of her share of the 
retirement income. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
[11-13] The defendant seeks an award 
)f attorney fees incurred on appeal, relying 
>n Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 
Utah CtApp. 1988), and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-3 (1989). In Rasband, we stated 
that a trial court has the power to make an 
award of attorney fees in divorce actions, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 
[1989), upon a showing of financial need 
and reasonableness. 752 P.2d at 1336. Or-
dinarily, when -fees in a divorce were 
awarded below to' the party who then pre-
vails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to 
that party on appeal. Weston v. Weston, 
773 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah Ct.App.1989); 
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 
(Utah CtApp. 1989). Conversely, when 
they were not awarded below, we will not 
generally award them on appeal, except 
when a party has presented a well-sup-
*• In evaluating the nature of defendant's IRA, 
the court must determine whether contributions 
were made with inherited funds, as an invest-
ment device, or with money earned from em-
ployment during the marriage to provide a true 
retirement benefit. If the former, the IRA is 
defendant's separate property; if the latter, it 
should be treated like the other retirement bene-
fits. 
7
- See note 6, supra. 
v. BURT Utah 1171 
166 (Utah App. 1990) 
ported claim of changed circumstances. 
See Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 
1061-62 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Riche v. 
Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470-71 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). The major exception, inapplicable 
here, is when an appeal is frivolous, in 
which event we will award fees regardless 
of the trial court's ruling on fees. See, e.g., 
Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990); Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 
(Utah Ct.App. 1988). Attorney fees were 
not awarded to defendant below and she 
has made no showing of changed circum-
stances necessitating that they be awarded 
to her on appeal. Accordingly, she is not 
entitled to an award of attorney fees in-
curred in this appeal. 
SUMMARY 
[14] Defendant's inherited property and 
its increase are properly characterized as 
defendant's separate property. The same 
is true of plaintiffs inherited property. 
Neither party's property has lost its sepa-
rate character. All retirement benefits, in-
cluding defendant's Social Security and 
possibly her IRA,7 are marital property and 
must be divided accordingly. As a mea-
sure of convenience, the court may simply 
award defendant one-half of the difference 
between the value of plaintiffs and defen-
dant's retirement.8 -* However, such - an 
award is not terminable alimony; it is a 
property interest. Similarly, the • marital 
home and possibly the savings accounts9 
are marital property and defendant must 
be granted her share. 
[15] The foregoing discussion assumes 
the proper application of Utah law in a 
situation where no extraordinary circum-
stances are found by the court to exist. 
8. While a present settlement is preferable, Motes 
v. Motes, 786 P.2d at 234, the trial court may 
award the defendant a share of the income 
stream from the retirement benefits as they are 
paid, id., not in the form of alimony but as a 
property award not terminable upon remar-
riage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989). 
9. The court must also consider whether the sav-
ings accounts awarded to plaintiff were marital 
property or separate property derived from 
plaintiffs inheritance. 
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However, these are presumptive only and 
not immutable principles. "The overriding 
consideration is that the ultimate division 
be equitable—that property be fairly divid-
ed between the parties given their contribu-
tions during the marriage and their circum-
stances at the time of the divorce." New-
meyer v. Neurmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 
(Utah 1987). On remand, the court should 
first properly categorize the parties' prop-
erty as part of the marital estate or as the 
separate property of one or the other. 
Each party is presumed to be entitled to all 
of-his or her separate property and fifty 
percent of the marital'property. But rath-
er than simply enter such a decree, the 
court should then consider the existence of 
exceptional circumstances and, if any be 
shown, proceed to effect an equitable dis-
tribution in light of those circumstances 
and in conformity with our decision. That 
having been done, the final step is to con-
sider whether, following appropriate divi-
sion of the property, one party or the other 
is entitled to alimony.10 
We recognize that the trial court at-
tempted to do equity in its distribution of 
the marital estate and acted in the face of 
atypical circumstances. Notwithstanding, 
the court's division of the estate cannot 
stand undisturbed when we are not 
presented with sufficient findings to dem-
onstrate that the court's ruling comports 
with established law. Accordingly, we re-
mand for further proceedings. The parties 
will bear their own attorney fees and costs. 
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
10. In prescribing a systematic approach on re-
mand, we do not suggest any particular out-
come following reconsideration. We do recog-
nize that our alteration of pivotajLportions of 
the trial court's decree may necessiupk reassess-
ment and adjustment of other portions of the 
Raychelle MERRIAM, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Todd MERRIAM, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 890484-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct 16, 1990. 
Mother appealed from divorce decKS 
of the Sixth District Court, Sanpete Conni 
ty, Don V. Tibbs, J., awarding custody of 
parties' child to father. The Court of Aj$ 
peals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) trial 
court could rely on child custody evaluation 
report even though it was never formally 
admitted into evidence and evaluator was 
not qualified as expert or called as witness 
at trial; (2) father's testimony supported 
finding regarding mother's extramarital af-
fairs, and those affairs could be considered 
in custody decision; (3) finding that neither 
parent had been child's primary caretaker 
during pendency of divorce did not reflect 
confusion by trial court, and balance of 
factors did not otherwise tip in favor oi 
custodial status quo; and (4) trial court 
gave adequate weight to desirability oi 
keeping child and his half-brother together 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <3=*301 
Child custody evaluation report could 
be relied on in making custody determina-
tion, even though report was not formally 
admitted into evidence and evaluator was 
never qualified as expert or called as wit-
ness at trial. Judicial Administration Rule 
4-903; Rules of Evid., Rule 706(a). 
decree and that the trial court has the authority 
to reconsider its entire decree in light of this 
court's opinion and to make such adjustments 
£ s may be necessary to achieve an equitaoe 
overall result. 
GILL v. GILL Utah 779 
Cite as 718 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986) 
tion (Per opinion of Hall, CJ., with one 
LeNore M. GILL, Plaintiff Judge concurring and one Judge not partic-
and Appellant, ipating.) 
v. 
Ruland J. GILL, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 19142. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 29, 1986. 
Rehearing Denied May 29, 1986. 
Wife appealed from order of the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis 
Frederick, J., dividing marital assets in di-
vorce action. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
3J., held that evidence was sufficient to 
support finding that husband did not hide 
)r secrete marital assets. 
Affirmed. 
Zimmerman, J., filed dissenting opinion 
in which Howe, J., concurred. 
L Divorce <s=»235, 252.1, 286(2) 
In adjusting financial and property in-
terests of parties to divorce, trial court is 
afforded considerable discretion, and its ac-
tions are cloaked with presumption of valid-
ity. (Per opinion of Hall, CJ., with one 
Judge concurring and one Judge not partic-
ipating.) 
2- Divorce <&=»206, 253(2) 
, Evidence regarding wife's knowledge 
of operations of husband's businesses was 
sufficient to support finding that husband 
*d not hide or secrete marital assets in 
^lation of restraining order or rights of 
*ife- (Per opinion of Hall, C J., with one 
•ttdge concurring and one Judge not partic-
S*ting.) 
!• Divorce <S=>192 
Not requiring husband to assume and 
P*y additional fees incurred by wife in di-
^ ^ action to resolve wife's contention 
*; husband had secreted or dissipated 
j ^ t a l ^sets was not abuse of discretion, 
** evidence in support of such conten-
0
 P.2d—18 
Gary L. Paxton, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant 
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
This appeal challenges the propriety of 
the district court's division of marital as-
sets. Plaintiff contends that she was enti-
tled to a proportionately larger share of the 
marital assets to compensate her for de-
fendant's alleged dissipation of those as-
sets during the pendency of the divorce 
action, in direct contravention of the 
court's injunction and restraining order. 
Plaintiff brought this action for divorce 
in September 1979. The parties' marital 
assets consisted of a residence, an automo-
bile, a pickup truck and camper, several 
horses, trailers, and, related taok, various 
life insurance policies, guns,
 C(camping 
equipment, furniture, jewelry, ^ personal 
items) an ongoing business known as Fleet-
way, Inc., and a defunct business known as 
Gill's Tire Market 
In October 1979, at plaintiffs instance 
and request and pursuant to stipulation, a 
restraining order was entered, against de-
fendant by which he was enjoined from^ 
encumbering or disposing,of any. marital 
property and any assets of Gill's Tire Mar-
ket or Fleetway, Inc., without the^ express 
prior knowledge and approval of plaintiff 
or without first obtaining an appropriate 
court order. At the time the order was 
entered, defendant was operating both 
businesses and making his living there-
from. Plaintiff did not participate in the 
management of either of the businesses, 
and after the restraining order was en-
tered, defendant continued to operate 
them. 
In December 1979, plaintiff sought and 
obtained an order bifurcating the divorce 
issue. A decree of divorce was obtained in 
January 1980, reserving the issue of prop-
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erty division for a subsequent proceeding. 
At the time the divorce decree was entered, 
defendant was continuing to operate the 
businesses known as GiU's Tire Market anc 
Fleetway, Inc. 
In October 1980, following the bankrupt-
cy of Gill's Tire Market and after Fleetway, 
Inc., had also failed, defendant utilized the 
remaining assets to open a retail tire store, 
which he operated under the name of Tire 
City for approximately two years. Two 
months prior to trial, defendant sold the 
assets of Tire City for $15,000, a sum near-
ly equal to Tire City's indebtedness. 
At trial, the focal issue was plaintiffs 
Contention that defendant had intentionally 
secreted or disposed of marital assets to 
deprive plaintiff of her rightful share. The 
trial court specifically found that defendant 
had not hidden any of the assets of the 
marital,estate and7had not attempted to 
deprive plaintiff of her interest in those 
assets. 'Th^cdurt then divided the assets 
on hand and awarded ~ generally equal 
shares to ^ch party. The court also or-
dered that the accounts receivable from the 
Fleetway Tire Market business be divided 
equally; that defendant pay the business 
debts and the marital debts incurred prior 
to separation; that any proceeds remaining 
from the business bankruptcy be divided 
equally; and that defendant pay all income 
tax obligations owing for the years 1977-
1979. 
The court limited its award of attorney 
fees to those incurred up to the time the 
decree of divorce was obtained in January 
1980. The court made no award for fees 
incurred by plaintiff for the purpose of 
showing that defendant had intentionally 
dissipated the marital assets. 
[1] The long-recognized and oft-re-
peated standard of appellate review per-
mits this Court to overturn the judgment of 
the trial court only when the evidence 
clearly preponderates to the contrary or 
the trial court has abused its discretion or 
1. Wiese v. Wiese, Utah, 699 P.2d 700. 701 (1985). 
2. Argyle v. Argyle, Utah, 688 P.2d 468, 470 
(1984). 
misapplied principles of law.1 In adjusting-
the financial and property interests of par-
ies to divorce, the trial court is afforded 
considerable discretion,2 and its actions are 
cloaked with a presumption of validity.3 
[2] The record reflects that although 
Gill's Tire Market and Fleetway, Inc., were 
not prospering, the parties were dependent 
upon the operation of those businesses for 
their livelihood. It necessarily follows that 
at the time the court entered its order 
restraining the disposition of marital as-
sets, it was within the contemplation of all 
concerned that defendant would continue to 
operate the businesses. 
It was reasonable for the trial court to 
conclude that plaintiff was aware of de-
fendant's business revenues and that plain-
tiff knew defendant had transferred the 
remaining assets of the defunct Fleetway, 
Inc., to the new business operated under 
the name of Tire City. This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that commencing in 
October 1979 and continuing to the time of 
trial, plaintiff engaged in extensive dis-
covery proceedings seeking evidence con-
cerning defendant's financial affairs and 
the businesses he continued to operate, spe-
cifically Tire City. Furthermore, no effort 
was made by plaintiff to restrain defendant 
from operating his businesses, and no cita-
tion for contempt was sought or obtained 
for any violation of the court's restraining 
order. 
Trial of this case extended over a period 
of three days, and the record is replete 
with evidence that bears upon the property 
division issue. Not unexpectedly, most of 
the testimony was controverted, but a can-
vass of the record fails to disclose any 
evidence that clearly preponderates con-
trary to the findings of the trial court that 
defendant did not hide or secrete marital 
assets in violation of the court's order or 
the rights of plaintiff. 
3. Savage v. Savage, Utah, 658 P.2d 1201, 1203 
(1983). 
GILL v. GILL 
Cite M 718 VIA 779 (Utah 1986) 
Utah 781 
[3] Plaintiffs remaining contention on 
appeal is that the court abused its discre-
tion in limiting the award of attorney fees. 
In substance and effect, the court conclud-
ed that the legal expense of conducting the 
extensive discovery proceedings engaged in 
by plaintiff was not reasonable and neces-
sary. 
In light of plaintiffs failure to demon-
strate either by way of discovery or by 
evidence elicited at tnal that defendant did 
in fact secrete or dissipate marital assets, 
the court did not abuse its discretion m not 
requiring defendant to assume and pay the 
additional fees plaintiff incurred. 
The propriety of the court's limited 
award of attorney fees is further indicated 
by the relative ability of the parties to pay 
their respective attorneys for services ren-
dered. Plaintiff was employed and earning 
approximately $12,000 per annum, and de-
fendant was unemployed and without in-
come from any source. 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
STEWART, J., concurs. 
* ZIMMERMAN. Justice (dissenting: 
I dissent The issue on appeal is wheth-
er the trial court erred when it found that 
Mr. Gill did not violate an injunction prohib-
iting him "from encumbering or disposing 
of in any manner whatsoever, any assets or 
properties of . . . Gill's Tire Market, Inc., or 
Pleetway, Inc., without the express, prior 
knowledge and approval of [Mrs. Gill] or 
without first obtaining an appropriate 
court order after' notice and applica-
tion...." (Emphasis added.) There is no 
conflict in the evidence that at the time the 
injunction was entered, pursuant to Mr. 
GUI's stipulation, the marital estate includ-
ed the business assets of Gill's Tire Market 
and Pleetway Tires, Inc. These assets 
^ere then worth approximately $50,000. 
yY the time the marital estate was divided 
* December of 1982, the value of the busi-
e s assets had diminished to approximate-
ly $6,000, primarily as a result of Mr. Gill's 
ns
*
er
 of those assets into a new, but 
unsuccessful business, Tire City. That 
transfer occurred without Mrs. Gill's "ex-
press, prior knowledge " and without any 
request to or order from the court, as 
required by the injunction. 
Contrary to the suggestion in the majori-
ty opinion, resolution of the issue presented 
by this case does not turn upon whether 
Mrs. Gill proved that Mr. Gill intentionally 
hid assets belonging to the marital estate 
or upon whether Mr. Gill intentionally at-
tempted to deprive Mrs. Gill of her interest 
in the business portion of the marital es 
tate. In determining whether one is chilly 
liable for violating an injunction, the ele-
ment of intent is irrelevant E.g., Rogers 
v. Pitt, 89 F. 424, 429 (Cir.CtNev.D.1898); 
Weston v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 158 
N.C. 270, 73 S.E. 799, 800 (1912). 
The absence of willfulness does not re-
lieve [an individual] from civil contempt. 
Civil as distinguished from criminal con-
tempt is a sanction to enforce compliance 
with an order of the court or to compen-
sate for losses or damages sustained by 
reason of noncompliance Since the 
purpose is remedial, it matters not with 
what intent the defendant did the prohib-
ited act 
McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 
U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct 497, 499, 93 L.Ed. 
599 (1949) (citations omitted). The Utah 
courts have long recognized that civil con-
tempt for violation of a court order or 
injunction requires no intent Gunnison 
Irrigation Co. v. Peterson, 74 Utah 46Qr 
464, 280 P. 715, 717 (1929). 
Thus, the issue on appeal is simply 
whether Mr. Gill violated the plain terms of 
the injunction to Mrs. Gill's detriment The 
terms of the injunction were clear. Its 
purpose was to preserve the marital estate 
against loss. Mr. Gill violated the injunc-
tion. Mrs. Gill clearly sustained damages 
as a result of that violation. The trial 
court acted contrary to the uncontradicted 
evidence when it refused to find the injunc-
tion had been violated and to compensate 
Mrs. Gill accordingly. 
The majority seems to rely in part on the 
fact that prior to the trial on division of 
assets, Mrs. Gill failed to petition the trial 
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court to hold her former husband liable for 
contempt Despite her failure to do so, 
however, the record establishes that she 
was diligent in her efforts to protect her 
interest
 rin the assets. Beginning with the 
commencement of the divorce action in De-
cember of 1979, Mrs. Gill took steps to 
determine the nature and disposition of the 
business assets. Mr. GDI was dilatory and 
evasive in responding to her repeated dis-
covery requests. His lack of candor forced 
Mrs. Gill to bring several motions to com-
pel, a motion in supplemental proceedings, 
orders to show cause, and a motion for 
sanctions. As late as the second day of 
trial in December of 1982, Mr. Gill was 
producing documents relating .to the status 
of the assets, and even then he did not 
comply fully with Mrs. Gill's earlier dis-
covery requests. Many of the discovery 
responses ultimately supplied were inex-
cusably dificient ~ The majority's opinion 
allows Mr/ Gill "to tnmefit from his own 
dilatory and evasive tactics. Mrs. Gill 
should not, be prejudiced for having pro-
ceeded, via means other than a contempt 
proceeding, to determine the value and dis-
position of her share of the assets. 
I would also hold that the trial court 
clearly abused its discretion in limiting 
Mrs. Gill's attorney fees, especially because 
a significant portion of those fees resulted 
from her repeated attempts to force Mr. 
Gill to comply with legitimate discovery 
requests. It is certainly true, as the major-
ity states, that we should defer to the trial 
court under appropriate circumstances. 
However, by affirming the unsupportable 
order of the trial court in this case, we are 
not deferring. Rather, we are abdicating 
our responsibility to see that orders re-
viewed by us are legally supportable, which 
the one involved in this case certainly is 
not 
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
DURHAM, J., having disqualified her-
self, does not participate herein. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SE-
CURITY OF the INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, Plaintiff, 
v. 
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT In and For CE-
DAR CITY DEPARTMENT, Iron Coun" 
ty, State of Utah, and Patricia J. Meis-
ter, Defendants. 
No. 20876. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 5, 1986. 
The Department of Employment Secur-
ity petitioned for writ of certiorari to re-
view orders s>f the Ninth Circuit Court, 
Iron County, pursuant to defendant's 
guilty * pleas to charges "of making false 
statements to obtain ^unemployment com-
pensation, that defendant pay restitution to 
the DES and that the DES cease and desist 
its collection efforts of remaining amount 
owed to it. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., 
held that (1) trial court's order requiring 
defendant to pay restitution to the DES of 
the $2,428 she had actually received as a 
condition of probation was within its discre-
tion, and the exercise of such discretion 
was not an arbitrary extension of judicial 
authority so as to effectively redetermine 
administration decision by the DES that 
claimant repay twice amount which which 
she had received by reason of her fraud, 
but (2) statute providing that the DES shall 
demand repayment of twice amount of un-
employment benefits fraudulently collected 
required the DES to collect the remaining 
one-half of the amount owed by defendant 
through civil proceedings or through is-
suance of a warrant 
Order vacated. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
*=>751 
Trial court's order requiring that de-
fendant convicted of making false state-
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Connie Rae POPE, Plaintiff, Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Dan LeRoy POPE, Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent 
No. 15538. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 15, 1978. 
Wife brought divorce proceeding. The 
First District Court, Cache County, VeNoy 
Christofferson, J., entered judgment divorc-
ing the parties, dividing their property, and 
awarding attorney fees and costs to wife, 
and husband appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Wilkins, J., held that' (1) trial 
court's division of marital property result-
ing in 65% of benefits to wife and 35% to 
husband did not constitute abuse of discre-
tion, since husband was awarded income-
producing assets of family, husband had 
two college degrees and several years expe-
rience in > operating his business, and wife 
had no college education and was unem-
ployed at time of trial; (2) trial court did 
not err in awarding wife $1,500 in attorney 
fees and $30 in costs, notwithstanding fact 
that wife, in her pleadings, prayed for only 
$1,000 in attorney fees and failed altogether 
to pray for costs, and (3) trial court did not 
err in ordering that if husband failed to pay 
wife specified sum of cash within six 
months of trial court's order that such 
amount would bear interest at the rate of 
10% per year. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <s=> 252.1, 286(2) 
Trial court in divorce action has con-
siderable latitude of discretion in adjusting 
financial and property interests, and party 
appealing therefrom has burden of proving 
that there was a misunderstanding or mis-
application of law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error, or that evidence clear-
ly preponderated against findings, or that 
such a serious inequity resulted as to mani-
fest a clear abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce «=> 252.2 
Trial court's division of marital proper-
ty resulting in 65% of benefits to wife and 
35% to husband did not constitute abuse of 
discretion, since husband was awarded in-
come-producing assets"'of family, husband 
had two college degrees and several years 
experience in operating his business, and 
wife had no college education and was un-
employed at time of trial. 
3. Divorce <*=»189, 196 
In divorce action, trial court did not err 
in awarding wife $1,500 in attorney fees 
and $30 in costs, notwithstanding fact that 
wife, in her pleadings, prayed for only 
$1,000 in attorney fees and failed altogether 
to pray for costs. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 54(c)(1). 
4. Interest <§=>38(1) 
In divorce action, trial court did not err 
in ordering that if husband failed to pay 
wife specified sum of cash within six 
months of trial court's order that such 
amount would bear interest at the rate of 
10% per year. 
Jay D. Edmonds, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant, appellant, and cross-respondent. 
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff, re-
spondent, and cross-appellant. 
WILKINS, Justice: 
This is a divorce action, in which the 
District Court for Cache County, sitting 
without a jury, entered a decree divorcing 
the parties, dividing their property, and 
awarding attorney's fees and costs to plain-
tiff. References herein to statutes and 
rules are to the Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
amended, and the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, respectively. 
Plaintiff and defendant were married 
more than ten years and have two daugh-
ters as issue of the marriage. After his 
marriage to plaintiff, defendant attended 
college and obtained a bachelor's degree in 
engineering and a master's degree in busi-
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ness administration. Plaintiff, on the other 
hand, terminated her education after one 
and one-half years of college and spent her 
time caring for the children. During their 
marriage, defendant* and plaintiff acquired 
assets, mentioned infra. 
In its division of this property the District 
Court awarded to defendant the family 
business property and certain other items of 
personalty, the net value of which was $76,-
577. Plaintiff was given the family resi-
dence, subject to the existing mortgage, the 
household furnishings, and certain other 
items of personalty. The net value of this 
property was $26,609. The District Court 
also ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $24,-
984 in cash, this being one-half of the 
amount by which the net value of property 
awarded defendant exceeded that awarded 
plaintiff. 
Defendant urges on appeal that the Dis-
trict Court erred in calculating the value of 
the parties' property and debts, resulting in 
an unjust and inequitable division of the 
property. He claims the Court failed to 
include certain debts owed by defendant 
amounting to $24,225 in its calculation of 
the value of the business and other property 
awarded to him. 
[1] It is well established that 
The trial court, in a divorce action, has 
considerable latitude of discretion in ad-
justing financial and property interests. 
A party appealing therefrom has the bur-
den to prove there was a misunderstand-
ing or misapplication of the law resulting 
in substantial and prejudicial error; or 
the evidence clearly preponderated 
against the findings; or such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. 
English v. English,i\Jtah, 565 P.2d 409, 410 
(1977). 
[2] However defendant's argument—in 
thrust—is that a serious inequity does exist 
as the obligation to pay the debts amount-
1. The District Court ordered that defendant pay 
all debts incurred by the parties since their 
marriage, excepting the house mortgage The 
debts which totaled $24,225 according to de-
fendant's testimony were incurred by the par-
ties after their marriage 
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ing to $24,225 results, in effect, in a division 
of the net value of property which gives 
sixty-five percent to the plaintiff and only 
thirty-five percent to the defendant.1 In 
light of the facts and circumstances of this 
case, we believe, however, that the Court's 
division of property is equitable. Defend-
ant was awarded the income-producing as-
sets of the family. He has two college 
degrees and several years experience in op-
erating his businesses and thus has a rea-
sonably assured future of earnings and 
profits from his business activities. Plain-
tiff, however, has no college education and 
was unemployed at the time of trial. The 
Court awarded her no alimony. She was 
given custody of the children and only $135 
per month for each child's support. 
Defendant's other allegations of errors 
and omissions relating to the division of 
property are either without merit or non-
prejudicial. 
[3] Defendant also contends that the 
Court's award to plaintiff of $l,5p0 attor-
ney's fees and $30 costs must be reversed 
since plaintiff, in her pleadings, prayed for 
only $1,000 in attorney's fees and failed 
altogether to pray for costs. 
Rule 54(c)(1) states in relevant part: 
Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, 
every final judgment shall grant the re-
lief to which the party in whose favor it 
is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his plead-
ings 
In Ferguson v. Ferguson, Utah, 564 P.2d 
1380 (1977), we held that under this Rule, 
an award of attorney's fees in excess of 
that requested in the pleadings, is allowable 
where the proof shows the party to be 
entitled to it. Also see Palombi v. D&C 
Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 
(1969). These cases properly applied Rule 
54(cXl) and are controlling here.2 The Dis-
2. In Palombi, it was stated "The fact that there 
was no specific pleading does not 
preclude such an award It is indeed important 
that the issue be raised that the parties have 
full opportunity to meet it" Here, certainly 
the issue was raised with full opportunity to 
meet it 
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trict Court's award on these two items was 
therefore not improper. 
[4] Apparently in order to induce de-
fendant to pay plaintiff the $24,984. cash 
within six months the District Court or-
dered that if the amount remained unpaid 
during this period that the amount would 
bear interest at the rate of ten percent per 
year. 
Sec. 15-1-4, which requires, except as 
noted therein (not applicable here), judg-
ments to bear interest at the rate of eight 
percent per year, does not preclude a Dis-
trict Court, under Sec. 30-3-5 3 from impos-
i n g an interest rate of more than eight 
percent where, under the circumstances, 
that award is reasonable and equitable. In 
this case such an award is both. The inter-
est rate here increased from eight to ten 
percent only when defendant failed to pay 
the amount within six months. The $24,984 
is the only cash which plaintiff was award-
ed. The court did not award alimony to 
plaintiff apd the child support is only $135 
per month per child. Plaintiff is unem-
ployed and will reasonably need cash in the 
near future for mortgage payments on the 
house and for her personal needs. Thus, 
requiring that defendant pay an additional 
two percent interest on the $24,984 in the 
event that defendant failed to pay plaintiff 
this amount within six months is a reasona-
ble exercise of the District Court's equitable 
discretion. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, 
MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur. 
3. This statute states in relevant part 
"the court may make such orders in relation to 
Carl WISEMAN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
VILLAGE PARTNERS and Continental 
Casualty, Defendants. 
No. 15729. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec 26, 1978. 
Claimant filed claim for workmen's 
compensation benefits arising out of injury 
allegedly received in course of his employ-
ment The Industrial Commission affirmed 
administrative law judge's decision denying 
award and denied a motion for review. 
The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that 
construing evidence in light most favorable 
to sustaining findings and order of Commis-
sion, substantial evidence supported Com-; 
mission's denial of award. . 
Affirmed. 
L Workers' Compensation <&=> 1939.5 
Upon review of Industrial Commis-
sion's decision upholding denial of work-
men's compensation award, the Supreme 
Court could not weigh contradictory evi-
dence for purpose of interposing its own 
judgment as to what the facts were. U.C. 
A.1953, 35-1-84. 
2. Workers' Compensation <&»1533 
Construing evidence in light most fa-
vorable to sustaining findings and order of 
Industrial Commission, substantial evidence 
supported Commission's denial of work-
men's compensation award to claimant, 
cause of whose back injury was subject of 
contradictory evidence. 
William B. Parsons, III, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff. 
property and the parties a s 
may be [applicable] " 
V. Glen NOBLE, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
Elaine Hanson NOBLE, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
Elaine Hanson NOBLE, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
V. Glen NOBLE, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
Nos. 19934, 20401. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 15, 1988. 
In separate actions, wife sued husband 
for personal injuries, and parties sought 
divorce. The Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, Don V. Tibbs and George E. Ballif, 
JJ., entered divorce decree and dismissed 
personal injury action, and appeals were 
taken. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, 
J., held that (1) alimony award and proper-
ty division were not abuse of discretion; (2) 
divorce action did not preclude wife from 
bringing personal injury action; and (3) 
divorce decree precluded husband from re-
litigating issue of whether he intentionally 
shot wife. 
Divorce decree affirmed and remand-
ed; tort judgment reversed and remanded. 
1. Divorce «=>82 
If spouses have tort claims pending 
against each other which are likely to have 
bearing on outcome of divorce action, those 
claims should be resolved prior to divorce 
proceedings. 
2. Divorce <3=*237, 252.2 
Divorce court did not improperly con-
sider wife's pending tort claim against hus-
band in determining property division and 
alimony award when it took into account 
NOBLE v. NOBLE Utah 1369 
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wife's medical and living expenses incurred 
as result of husband's shooting of her. 
3. Divorce «=>240(1) 
Trial court, in setting alimony, must 
attempt to provide support for receiving 
spouse sufficient to maintain that spouse 
as nearly as possible at standard of living 
enjoyed during marriage; trial court must 
make sufficient findings to demonstrate 
that it considered financial condition and 
needs of party seeking alimony, that par-
ty's ability to produce sufficient income, 
and ability of other party to provide sup-
port. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
4. Divorce <e»240(2) 
Award of $750 per month in alimony 
was not abuse of discretion where there 
was evidence that husband's shooting of 
wife left her totally and permanently dis-
abled, with monthly expenses of $2,600, 
and evidence that husband's present in-
come was insufficient to provide for his 
needs and still meet wife's needs. 
5. Divorce <e=>199 
Overarching aim of property division, 
and of decree to which it and alimony 
award are subsidiary parts, is to achieve 
fair, just, and equitable result between par-
ties. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
6. Divorce «=>252.3(3) 
Property division awarding wife por-
tion of premarital assets of husband was 
not abuse-of discretion given wife's total 
disability due to husband's shooting of her, 
and_husband's inability to provide suffi-
cient alimony to meet wife's present and 
future needs. 
7. Damages «=>127 
To extent that divorce court took into 
account wife's disabilities resulting from 
her injuries by husband, by awarding her 
more alimony or property than she would 
have received but for the injuries, wife was 
not entitled to additional damages in pend-
ing personal injury action against husband. 
8. Divorce «=»255 
Wife's tort claims against husband 
were not tried as such in divorce action, 
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and thus claim preclusion did not bar wife 
from proceeding on intentional tort claims 
and recovering damages. 
9. Judgment <3=»634 
Elements required if determination of 
issue in preceding case is to bind parties in 
later case are: issues must be identical, 
judgment must be final, party estopped 
must be party or in privity with party to 
preceding adjudication, and issue must 
have been competently, fully, and fairly 
litigated. 
10. Divorce <S=*172 
Husband, as defendant in wife's per-
sonal injury action, was precluded from 
relitigating specific finding made in prior 
divorce action that he intentionally shot 
wife where issue of husband's liability for 
shooting was raised in divorce pleadings, 
was fully and fairly litigated, and was ex-
pressly made basis for granting wife's 
counterclaim for divorce. 
Jackson B. Howard, Provo, Raymond M. 
Berry, Kent M. Kasting, Salt Lake City, for 
V. Glen Noble. 
W. Eugene Hansen, Salt Lake City, for 
Elaine Hanson Noble. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
In this decision, we dispose of two con-
solidated appeals. The first arises from a 
divorce action between Elaine Noble and 
Glen Noble in which a divorce decree was 
granted to Elaine. Glen seeks to modify 
the alimony award and property division. 
We affirm the decree but remand for addi-
tional findings. The second appeal arises 
from the summary judgment dismissing 
Elaine's separately filed tort action against 
Glen based upon his having shot her. 
Elaine seeks a reversal of the order of 
dismissal. We reverse the summary judg-
ment and reinstate her intentional tort 
claims. 
1. Glen was tried and acquitted by a jury of 
attempted murder. Neither party argues that 
Elaine and Glen were married in July of 
1977, when Elaine was thirty-four years old 
and Glen was fifty-eight. This was the 
second marriage for each, and no children 
were born of the marriage. On August 18, 
1980, while Elaine was lying on their bed, 
Glen shot her in the head at close range 
with a .22 caliber rifle.1 He then attempt-
ed to commit suicide by shooting himself 
under the chin with the same rifle. Ap-
proximately seven months later, Glen initi-
ated a divorce action in the Fourth Judicial 
District. That case was assigned to Judge 
Tibbs, sitting by special appointment. 
Elaine counterclaimed for divorce on 
grounds that Glen had physically abused 
her, leaving her unable to work. Elaine 
later filed a personal injury action against 
Glen. That case was assigned to Judge 
Ballif in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Elaine asserted claims based on negligence, 
battery, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. In April of 1983, Judge 
Ballif entered partial summary judgment 
for Glen, ruling that Elaine's negligence 
claim was barred by the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity. Elaine filed a notice of 
intent to appeal the dismissal of her negli-
gence claim and continued to pursue the 
intentional tort claims. 
The divorce action was tried before 
Judge Tibbs on December 22, 1983^  and a 
divorce decree in Elaine's favor was en-
tered. In fixing the alimony and the prop-
erty division, Judge Tibbs expressly took 
into account Elaine's increased living ex-
penses and decreased earning ability result-
ing from the disabilities caused by the 
shooting. 
Glen then brought a motion for summary 
judgment in the tort action pending before 
Judge Ballif, arguing that Elaine's inten-
tional tort claims had, in effect, been decid-
ed in the divorce action because the alimo-
ny and property awards were to some ex-
tent intended to compensate for the shoot-
ing injuries. Judge Ballif agreed and, rely-
ing on the doctrine of res judicata, dis-
missed Elaine's tort action in its entirety. 
the outcome of that criminal action has any 
bearing on the divorce and tort claims. 
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Glen appeals from the divorce decree. 
Elaine appeals from the summary judg-
ment dismissing her tort claims. We will 
discuss the two appeals separately, consid-
ering first the challenge to the divorce de-
cree and then the attack on the dismissal of 
the tort action. At the outset, we empha-
size that the issues in these appeals proba-
bly would not have arisen and the resolu-
tion of both cases would have been greatly 
expedited had the tort case been tried be-
fore the divorce action. As a general rule, 
that is how such cases should be handled, 
and it is the course of action that should 
have been followed here.2 
I. The Divorce Action 
In the divorce decree, Judge Tibbs 
awarded Elaine alimony of $750 per month, 
the house she brought into the marriage, a 
$264,000 share of the approximately $800,-
000 in assets that Glen brought to the 
marriage, and $10,000 in attorney fees.3 
[1] Glen's first argument is that Judge 
Tibbs improperly considered Elaine's tort 
claims in the divorce action. We held in 
Waltker v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 
(Utah 1985), that it is improper to try a tort 
claim, as such, within a divorce action. Ac-
cord Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1291 
(Utah 1983). Tort claims, which are legal 
in nature, should be kept separate from 
divorce actions, which are equitable in na-
ture. As a practical matter, if spouses 
have tort claims pending against each other 
which are likely to have a bearing on the 
outcome of the divorce action, those claims 
should be resolved prior to the divorce pro-
ceedings.4 
2, Although that course of action was con-
sidered, it was not followed for reasons that are 
not entirely clear. 
3. Glen now challenges the award of attorney 
fees. However, he raises this issue for the first 
time in his reply brief, contrary to rule 24(c), 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (formerly 
entitled Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
24(c)). And he provide no reasoning or au-
thority to support this *im of error. There-
fore, we deem any err© «.o have been waived. 
See Romrtll v. Zions First Natl Bank, 611 P.2d 
392, 395 (Utah 1980). 
[2] In this case, Glen contends that 
Judge Tibbs combined the two proceedings 
and used the property division and alimony 
award as a means of giving Elaine dam-
ages properly attributable to her tort 
claims. The record does not support this 
contention. Judge Tibbs was fully in-
formed that the tort claims were being 
tried in a separate action before Judge 
Ballif. For that reason, Judge Tibbs stated 
in his findings and conclusions that he had 
avoided consideration of the merits of the 
tort claims qua tort claims, and our review 
of the record provides us with no cause to 
dispute that assertion. It is true that some 
of the facts relevant to the tort claims were 
considered in the divorce proceeding, in-
cluding Elaine's medical and living ex-
penses incurred as a result of the shooting, 
as well as Glen's role in causing her inju-
ries. However, it was not improper to take 
those factors into account in the context of 
the divorce action. As we explained in 
Walther, 709 P.2d at 388 (citing Anderson 
v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 109, 138 P.2d 
252, 254 (1943)), "[Injuries and attendant 
medical expenses [caused by a spouse's 
tort] may be considered" in deciding the 
level of need of the other spouse in a 
divorce proceeding. And because Elaine's 
counterclaim for divorce was based on 
Glen's cruelty to her, it was proper for 
Judge Tibbs to consider the issue of Glen's 
fault in causing those injuries. Merely be-
cause Judge Tibbs considered facts rele-
vant to the divorce action that were also 
relevant to the tort action does not mean 
that he impermissibly adjudicated the tort 
claims in the divorce action. 
4. To do otherwise may raise significant con-
cerns if a fact question with respect to which a 
party has requested a jury and is entitled to a 
jury verdict is first decided by a judge in an 
equitable proceeding. Cf. Beacon Theaters, Inc. 
v. Westover, 359 VS. 500, 510-11, 79 S.Ct. 948, 
956-957, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) (the federal con-
stitutional right to a jury trial of legal issues 
may be lost through prior judicial determina-
tion of equitable claims only in the most imper-
ative circumstances). However, those concerns 
have not been raised by the parties to this case. 
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Glen's second argument, which is some-
thing of a variation on the theme of the 
first, is that Judge Tibbs abused his discre-
tion in setting the amount of the alimony 
award and in dividing the property. He 
contends that the award and distribution 
were unjustifiably generous to Elaine, par-
ticularly in light of the short duration of 
the marriage, and that the only explanation 
for this generosity is an intent to punish 
Glen for the shooting and to compensate 
Elaine for her injuries. 
[3] We first address Glen's challenge to 
the $750-per-month alimony award. We 
accord trial courts broad discretion in 
awarding alimony so long as the trial court 
exercises its discretion "in accordance with 
the standards that have been set by this 
Court" Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 
1074 (Utah 1985). We require that a trial 
court, in setting alimony, attempt to pro-
vide support for the receiving spouse suffi-
cient to maintain that spouse as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. In determining the 
amount of the award necessary to accom-
plish this aim, the trial court must make 
adequate findings and conclusions demon-
strating that it has considered three 
factors: (i) the financial condition and 
needs of the party seeking alimony, (ii) that 
party's ability to produce a sufficient in-
come, and (iii) the ability of the other party 
to provide support. Davis v. Davis, 749 
P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988); Jones v Jones, 
700 P.2d at 1074-75; see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5 (1984 & Supp.1988). In weighing 
those three factors, it is entirely appropri-
ate for the trial court to take into account 
whether physical or mental disabilities aris-
ing during the marriage, regardless of 
their cause, have made the receiving par-
ty's needs greater or reduced that party's 
ability to produce an income. The fact that 
such disabilities may have resulted from 
the tortious acts of another, including the 
divorcing spouse, certainly does not pre-
clude the trial court from considering those 
disabilities. We said as much in Walther, 
709 P.2d at 388. 
[4] Applying those rules to this case, 
the disabilities Elaine suffered as a result 
of her injuries at Glen's hands were an 
important consideration in assessing the 
first two Jones factors—Elaine's financial 
condition and needs and her ability to pro-
duce an income. Judge Tibbs specifically 
found that Elaine had suffered permanent 
injuries which left her unemployable, un-
able to operate a motor vehicle, and "total-
ly and permanently disabled." Evidence 
was presented that as a result, Elaine need-
ed approximately $2,600 per month to meet 
her expenses. Glen has not challenged 
those findings of fact. Applying the third 
Jones factor, Glen's ability to provide sup-
port, the court found that Glen's present 
income was insufficient to provide for his 
needs and still meet Elaine's needs. It set 
alimony at only $750 per month, but also 
considered its finding of Elaine's need for 
much higher alimony when it fixed the 
property division, as will be discussed be-
low. 
Judge Tibbs made the required findings 
and conclusions demonstrating his consid-
eration of the Jones factors. He quite 
properly took into account Elaine's needs 
and disabilities resulting from her injuries. 
By no stretch of the imagination could the 
$750-per-month award be deemed exces-
sive, and we reject Glen's challenge to the 
award as meritless. 
We next consider Glen's challenge to the 
property division. This is a variation on 
the argument advanced regarding the ali-
mony award. After finding that Elaine 
needed $2,600 per month for expenses arid 
was unemployable and that Glen could af-
ford only $750 per month in alimony, the 
judge also found that because of the differ-
ence in the parties' ages, Elaine could be 
expected to outlive Glen by some twenty-
five years, years during which she would 
be without alimony and otherwise unable to 
earn an income. In light of these circum-
stances, the court made what it termed an 
"unusual order" awarding Elaine $264,000 
of Glen's assets as a means of supplement-
ing the clearly inadequate alimony award 
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and ensuring that Elaine would have a 
source of support in the future. Before 
this Court, Glen argues that in making this 
division Judge Tibbs improperly considered 
the needs that resulted from Elaine's inju-
ries. He contends that it was error to give 
her property she did not bring into the 
marriage and that she should have received 
only her house and personal effects. 
[5,TC]) We do not lightly disturb a trial 
courts division of property in a divorce 
decree and will uphold a division made in 
accordance with the standards we have set 
and in the exercise of the trial court's dis-
cretion "except where to do so would work 
a manifest injustice or inequity." Pusey v. 
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986); Sav-
age v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 
1983) (quoting Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 
6, 8 (Utah 1982)). The overarching aim of 
a property division, and of the decree of 
which it and the alimony award are subsidi-
ary parts, is to achieve a fair, just, and 
equitable result between the parties. See 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 
(Utah 1980); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(1984 & Supp.1988). Stated more specifi-
cally, the purpose of property divisions is 
to allocate property in the manner which 
"best serves the needs of the parties and 
best permits them to pursue their separate 
lives." Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 
(Utah 1987); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 
1074-75. Given this purpose, it is entirely 
proper for a trial court making a property 
division to consider all the needs of each 
spouse, regardless of the cause of the disa-
bilities that give rise to those needs. And, 
contrary to Glen's contention, there is no 
per se ban on awarding one spouse a por-
tion of the premarital assets of another. 
In fact, our cases have consist^tjy_Jigld 
that under appropriate circun^tences, 
achieving a fair, just, and equitable result 
may require that the trial court exercise its 
discretion to award one spouse the premari-
tal property of the other. E.g., Burke, 733 
P.2d at 135 (citing Workman v. Workman, 
652 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1982)). 
The question then is whether Judge 
Tibbs abused his discretion in making the 
property division when he took account of 
Elaine's need for present and future sup-
port and Glen's inability to provide suffi-
cient alimony. We recently explained in 
Newmeyer v. Netvmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 
1279 n. 1 (Utah 1987), that the issues of 
alimony and property division are not en-
tirely separable. 
[Njeither the trial court nor this Court 
considers the property division in a vac-
uum. The amount of alimony awarded 
and the relative earning capabilities of 
the parties are also relevant, because the 
relative abilities of the spouses to sup-
port themselves after the divorce are per-
tinent to an equitable determination of 
the division of the fixed assets of the 
marriage. 
Id; see Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697, 
699-700 (Utah 1974). The gross inadequa-
cy of the alimony available to provide for 
Elaine's needs, the paucity of her separate 
premarital property, and Glen's relative 
wealth all warranted Judge Tibbs' award-
ing Elaine a substantial portion of Glen's 
premarital property. We cannot say that 
the amount awarded was excessive under 
the circumstances. 
[7] Finally, Glen argues that if the di-
vorce decree is allowed to stand and Elaine 
is successful in her tort action, she might 
receive double compensation for her inju-
ries. We agree that to the extent that the 
divorce decree has taken account of disabil-
ities resulting from her injuries by award-
ing her more alimony or property than she 
would have received but for the injuries, 
she should not be compensated for those 
disabilities again through special damages 
in tort In its present form, the divorce 
decree does not specify to what precise 
extent the alimony and property awards 
are based on needs or disabilities arising 
from the shooting which could also be the 
basis for special damages in tort, such as 
lost earning ability and medical expenses. 
Therefore, we remand the divorce case to 
Judge Tibbs with instructions that he make 
findings of sufficient specificity to enable 
Judge Ballif to avoid duplicate compensa-
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tion in the tort action. The divorce decree 
is affirmed in all other respects. 
II. The Tort Actions 
Elaine appeals from Judge Ballif s deci-
sion dismissing her intentional tort claims 
on the basis of the claim preclusion branch 
of the doctrine of res judicata.5 And she 
argues that if she is allowed to proceed 
with that action, Glen should be bound 
under the issue preclusion branch of res 
judicata by the divorce court's specific find-
ing that he intentionally shot Elaine. 
[8] Neither of these arguments re-
quires extensive analysis. The rules of res 
judicata and the records in both of these 
cases fully support Elaine's position. 
Judge Ballif ruled that Elaine's intentional 
tort claims had been litigated and deter-
mined in the earlier divorce action and were 
therefore barred under the rules of claim 
preclusion. In Penrod v. Nu Creation 
Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983), 
we explained that claim preclusion applies 
only to claims that actually were or could 
and should have been litigated in the prior 
action. Tort claims qua tort claims should 
not be tried as part of a divorce action, 
Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d at 388, and 
the record shows that Elaine's tort claims, 
as such, were not tried. Therefore, claim 
preclusion does not bar Elaine from pro-
ceeding on her intentional tort claims and 
5. The doctrine of res judicata has two branches, 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. As the 
United States Supreme Court has noted, there 
has been a great deal of confusion with respect 
to the "varying and, at times, seemingly conflict-
ing terminology" used in discussing the doctrine 
and its two branches. Migra v. Warren City 
School Dist Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n. 1, 
104 S.CL 892, 894 n. 1, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). 
Much confusion has resulted from the use of the 
term "res judicata" to refer to either claim pre-
clusion alone or to the overall doctrine, incorpo-
rating both claim and issue preclusion. To 
avoid engendering further confusion, we will 
use "res judicata" to refer to the overall doctrine 
of the preclusive effects to be given prior judg-
ments. We will use the term "claim preclusion" 
to refer to the branch which has often been 
referred to as "res judicata" or "merger and 
bar." And we use the term "issue preclusion" to 
refer to the branch often termed "collateral es-
recovering damages. Once proper findings 
have been made by Judge Tibbs with re-
spect to the specific elements of loss or 
injury considered in making the alimony 
and property awards, it will be a simple 
matter for Judge Ballif to structure the 
tort case so as to avoid duplicate compensa-
tion. The claim preclusion ruling was er-
ror, and we reverse the grant of summary 
judgment and remand for further proceed-
ings on the claims of battery and intention-
al infliction of emotional distress. 
[9] Elaine argues that on remand of the 
tort case, Glen should be precluded from 
relitigating the specific finding made in the 
divorce action that he intentionally shot 
her.6 In Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 
689, 691 (Utah 1978), we reviewed the rules 
of issue preclusion and listed the elements 
generally accepted to be required if the 
determination of an issue in a preceding 
case is to bind the parties in a later case: (i) 
the issues must be identical, (ii) the judg-
ment must be final, (iii) the party estopped 
must be a party or in privity with a party 
to the preceding adjudication, and (iv) the 
issue must have been competently, fully, 
and fairly litigated. In this case, the par-
ties only dispute whether the second and 
fourth elements have been satisfied. 
There is no merit in Glen's lack-of-finali-
ty claim, at least at this point. Although 
he appealed from the divorce decree, Glen 
did not challenge the specific finding of 
toppel." See the discussions in Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 
1983), Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista 
Ranch, Inc., 86 Utah Adv.Rep. 29, 30 (Utah App. 
1988), and Lane v. Honeywell Inc., 663 F.Supp. 
370, 371 n. 1, 372 & n. 2 (D.Utah 1987). See 
generally F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 
§ 11.3 (3d ed. 1985); C. Wright, A. Miller & E. 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Juris-
diction § 4402 (1981). 
6. Finding No. eight in the divorce proceeding 
reads: "On the late night of the 18th of August 
1980, plaintiff intentionally and willfully and 
without just cause, shot the defendant Elaine 
Hans[o]n Noble, in the head with a .22 caliber 
rifle, thereby causing severe bodily injury to the 
defendant." 
liability for the shooting. 
affirmance of the decree disposes of the 
finality issue. 
[10] Glen's second argument, that the 
issue was not fully and fairly litigated be-
cause it was not essential to the divorce 
decree, is entirely contrary to the record, 
and we reject it as meritless. Section 30-
3-l(3Xg) of the Code provides that cruel 
treatment causing bodily injury is grounds 
for divorce. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-l(3Xg) (Supp.1988) (formerly codi-
fied at Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(7) (1984)). 
Elaine's counterclaim for divorce was 
based on Glen's cruelty to her. The issue 
of liability for the shooting was raised in 
the pleadings, was fully and fairly litigat-
ed, and was expressly made the basis for 
granting Elaine's counterclaim for divorce. 
Throughout the divorce proceeding, Glen 
was repeatedly put on notice that issue 
preclusion would be asserted against him in 
the tort case. As Glen's own memorandum 
urging the trial court to dismiss on 
grounds of claim preclusion accurately ex-
plained, 'The key issue to the present tort 
action—whether or not an intentional tort 
was committed [—] was in fact litigated in 
the divorce action It cannot be dis-
puted that a dominant issue in the divorce 
action between these parties was whether 
an intentional shooting took place." The 
policies behind the doctrine of res judicata 
would be ill-served by allowing Glen to 
force Elaine to retry this issue. 
We have considered the remaining argu-
ments and find them to be without merit. 
The divorce decree is remanded for further 
findings but affirmed in all respects. The 
summary judgment dismissing Elaine's in-
tentional tort claims is reversed, and those 
claims are remanded for further proceed-
ings in which Glen will be bound by the 
7. Elaine has also appealed from Judge Ballifs 
ruling that her negligence claim was barred by 
the doctrine of interspousal immunity. She ar-
gues that the partial summary judgment was in 
error because the common law doctrine was 
held to have been abrogated as to negligence 
actions in Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 
1980). In Stoker, this Court held that the doc-
CHRISTENSON v. JEWKES Utah 1375 
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At any rate, our previous finding of liability for intentional-
ly shooting Elaine.7 After general and spe-
cial damages have been set, the trial court 
is instructed to offset that portion of spe-
cial damages provided for in the divorce 
decree, as shown by the revised findings to 
be made by Judge Tibbs. Costs on both 
appeals are awarded to Elaine. 
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ., 
and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., 
concur. 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Richard A. CHRISTENSON, Trustee for 
Cape Trust, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Paul JEWKES and Lorna Jewkes, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 19984. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 25, 1988. 
Creditor brought deficiency judgment 
action against debtors after nonjudicial 
trust deed sale of undeveloped real proper-
ty. The Fourth District Court, Utah Coun-
ty, J. Robert Bullock, J., by jury verdict, 
entered judgment in favor of debtors. 
trine had been abrogated with respect to inten-
tional torts. Id. at 590, 592. We have never had 
occasion to decide whether this abrogation ex-
tended to negligence claims, and we do not do 
so in this case. It is unnecessary for us to reach 
that question because our disposition of Elaine's 
intentional tort action makes it a certainty that 
she will have a remedy for her injuries. 
SMITH v. SMITH 
Ctte•»751 PJd 1149 (UtahApp. 1988) 
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not necessarily binding on the trial court in 
its distribution of marital property. Jack-
son, 617 P.2d at 340. 
[14,15] At the time of trial, plaintiff 
had already invested $30,000 of the award 
proceeds in the National Military Under-
writers stock. When plaintiff purchased 
the stock, it was valued at its purchase 
price, but its current value is unknown. 
An in-kind distribution of closely-held cor-
porate stock is appropriate where the evi-
dence fails to establish the stock's value. 
Savage, 658 P.2d at 1204-05. The trial 
court awarded plaintiff one-half of the 
stock and defendant the other half and all 
the remaining cash proceeds. It would be 
inappropriate, given the speculative nature 
of the investment and the fact that defend-
ant has already been awarded the major 
income-producing assets, for plaintiff to re-
ceive all of the stock and defendant to 
receive offsetting property. We further 
note that plaintiff was not given an equal 
share in the award proceeds from the out-
set, but only an equal share in the National 
Military Underwriters stock, so defendant's 
objection to an equal division of the award 
proceeds is not well taken. While we do 
not condone plaintiffs behavior in award-
ing herself a pre-trial "distribution" of joint 
assets, in view of the entire allocation of 
marital assets, we do not find that the trial 
court abused its discretion. See Boyle, 735 
P.2d at 670-71. 
ified when there has been a change in the 
circumstances or condition of a party since 
the entry of the original decree. Thomp-
son v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 
1985); Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299, 
1300 (Utah 1980). 
[ 16] However, defendant has neither al-
leged nor proven such changed circum-
stances, so the trial court did not err in 
refusing to modify the decree.2 
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm 
the trial court's order and award costs to 
plaintiff. 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
( O | KfYNUMKR SYSTEM^ 
Charlotte B. SMITH, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
"v. 
Daniel Harold SMITH, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 860252-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 23, 1988. 
Future Effect of Decree With Respect 
to Defendant's Medical Needs 
Defendant argues that the trial court did 
not look ahead to his future medical needs 
in fashioning the decree. Immediately af-
ter the decree was entered, defendant filed 
a motion to modify, which the court denied. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1984) has been 
consistently interpreted to mean that the 
trial court has continuing jurisdiction over 
the divorce decree with respect to property 
distributions, and the decree may be mod-
s' Since the filing of this appeal, the trial court, 
under its continuing jurisdiction, entered a sup-
plemental recommendation and order reducing 
Parties' marriage was dissolved by the 
Sixth District Court, Garfield County, Don 
V. Tibbs, J., and husband appealed from 
court's property distribution and alimony 
awards. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., 
held that (1) divorce court order awarding 
wife the marital home and all furnishings 
and appliances therein and ordering hus-
band to repay mother's purchase-money, 
loan was not abuse of discretion, and (2) 
award of $425 per month in temporary 
alimony was not abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed. 
the alimony award to $350 per month due to a 
reduction in defendant's income. 
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1. Divorce «=>235, 252.1, 286(3, 5) 
Divorce court has considerable discre-
tion in adjusting financial and property in-
terests of parties, and Court of Appeals 
will not disturb court's decision unless it is 
clearly unjust or clear abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce «=»240(2), 252.2 
Divorce court should distribute proper-
ty and income to allow parties to readjust 
their lives to new circumstances. 
3. Divorce «=»252.5(1, 3) 
Divorce court order awarding wife the 
marital home and all furnishings and appli-
ances therein and ordering husband to re-
-pay mother's purchase-money loan was not 
"abuse of discretion, where wife was only 14 
years old at time of marriage and did not 
have high school education, and husband 
anticipated earnings of at least $1,450 per 
month. „ 
4. Divorce «=>211 
Divorce court order awarding 16-year-
old wife $425 per month in temporary ali-
mony, until loans on mobile home and car 
were satisfied, was not abuse of discretion, 
where wife had not completed high school 
and had no vocational or technical training, 
and husband anticipated earnings of at 
least $1,450 per month. 
Benjamin P. Knowlton (argued), Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
Michael R. Labrum (argued), Labrum & 
Taylor, Richfield, for plaintiff and respon-
dent 
Before BILLINGS, DAVIDSON and 
GARFF, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant husband appeals from the 
property distribution and alimony provi-
sions of the decree of divorce. Defendant 
contends the trial court abused its discre-
tion in awarding plaintiff wife properties 
partially paid for by his mother and in 
ordering him to pay the debts thereon, and 
in fixing alimony at $425.00 per month 
payable until the debt on a mobile home 
and a car were satisfied. He seeks a modi-
fication of the decree or, alternatively, to 
have the decree reversed and the case re-
manded. We affirm. 
FACTS 
The parties were married on July 27 
1984. At the time of the marriage, plain-
tiff was fourteen years of age and still 
enrolled in high school. Defendant was 
twenty-four years of age. The day follow-
ing the marriage plaintiff gave birth to the 
couple's only child. Plaintiff filed for di-
vorce on January 30, 1986. Defendant's 
mother filed a "Notice of Interest" in the 
action, claiming ownership or security in-
terests in some of the marital assets. 
At trial, plaintiff testified she was em-
ployed at a cafe for roughly eight months 
during 1985, after which time she was un-
employed. During these eight months, she 
earned $3,846.00. Plaintiffs only other 
employment during the marriage was tem-
porary seasonal work at Escalante Sawmill 
for one month prior to the divorce trial at a 
monthly salary of $714.00. At the time of 
trial, plaintiff had not completed high 
school and had no vocational or technical 
training. She estimated her minimum 
monthly expenses for herself and the child 
at $1,161.00, which included the monthly 
payments on the automobile and mobile 
home. 
Defendant worked for Escalante Sawmill 
as a "millwright" His 1985 W2 form re-
flected earnings of $20,302.80. At trial, 
defendant testified this amount was un-
usually high because of an abundance of 
overtime. He projected his future income 
to be $7.88 per hour, averaging 88 hours 
every two weeks, for a total prospective 
gross monthly income of approximately 
$1,450.00. He estimated his monthly ex-
penses to be between $513.00 and $563.00. 
The only evidence adduced at trial re-
garding the couple's marital assets was an 
exhibit, introduced by plaintiff, which listed 
the couple's property, the fair market val-
ues of each item, the amount of debt, if 
any, thereon, and the resulting net values. 
Both parties conceded that defendant's 
SMITH v. SMITH 
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mother purchased, either by lending the 
couple cash or purchasing the items herself 
on credit, the parties' mobile home, a wash-
er and the dryer, and a wood burning 
stove. Defendant's mother purchased 
these assets on the condition that she be 
repaid. 
The trial court awarded plaintiff custody 
of the couple's daughter plus child support 
in the amount of $170.00 per month. Nei-
ther of these determinations is contested. 
The court found that plaintiff had an earn-
ing capacity of $700.00 per month while 
defendant had an earning capacity of 
$1,500.00 per month. The court awarded 
plaintiff the mobile home; furnishings and 
appliances therein, including the washer, 
dryer, and wood-burning stove; and a car. 
The court ordered plaintiff to satisfy the 
liens owing on the mobile home and the 
car. Defendant was ordered to pay 
$425.00 per month in temporary alimony, 
composed of $275.00 per month attributa-
ble to the mobile home payment and 
$150.00 attributable to the car payment 
This $11,000.00 temporary alimony award 
is to terminate when these two debts are 
satisfied. .Moreover, the court ordered de-
fendant to pay all debts owing to his moth-
er. 
Two issues are presented on appeal. 
First, did the trial court abuse its discretion 
in distributing the marital assets? Second, 
did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
fixing alimony at $425.00, to be paid until 
the liens on the mobile home and a car are 
satisfied? 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
[1,2] In divorce actions, the trial court 
has considerable discretion in adjusting the 
financial and property interests of the par-
ties, Lee v. Lee, 14A P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah 
CtApp.1987), and we will not disturb its 
decision unless it is clearly unjust or a clear 
abuse of discretion. Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988). The trial 
court should distribute property and in-
come to allow the parties to readjust their 
"
ves to their new circumstances. How-
ever, the trial court must make findings on 
&U material issues, and its failure to do so 
constitutes reversible error unless the facts 
in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, 
and capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment" Id. at 1078 (quot-
ing Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987)); Lee, 744 P.2d at 1380. 
[3] As stated, the trial court awarded 
plaintiff the mobile home; the furnishings 
therein, including the washer and dryer, 
and wood-burning stove; and a car. De-
fendant was awarded a 1978 Ford flatbed, 
a 1972 Ford pickup, a 1979 Ford Bronco, a 
camptrailer, a trailer, a honda motorcycle, 
a camper shell, 12 acres of property in 
Arizona, guns, mechanic tools, a television, 
a stereo, and records. Although the trial 
court in its findings did not assign a value 
to any asset, according to the only evidence 
submitted at trial, plaintiffs apportioned 
share of property has a value of $3,500.00 
while defendant's has an estimated value 
of $15,500.00. Because defendant did not 
present any evidence on the value of the 
assets, we do not find the trial court's 
distribution clearly unjust or a clear abuse 
of discretion because the facts in the record 
are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment" . Gardner,. 748 P.2d^ at 1078 
(quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987)). 
Defendant's primary challenge ~ to the 
property distribution is that the trial court 
awarded plaintiff properties in which his 
mother had an ownership interest We dis-
agree with defendant's characterization. At 
review of the record clearly indicates that 
the parties conceded that defendant's moth-
er either purchased the assets herself or 
lent the parties the money to purchase the 
assets on the condition that she be repaid, 
making the mother's interest that of a 
creditor rather than an owner. The court 
acknowledged the mother's interest and de-
termined the mother should be repaid. 
Consequently, the court ordered defendant 
to repay his mother. Given defendant's 
earning potential vis-a-vis plaintiffs, we do 
not find that the trial court's property allo-
cation constituted an abuse of discretion. 
ALIMONY 
[4] Defendant also claims the trial 
court's dfder to have him pay the $275.00 
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monthly mobile home payment and the par-
tial $150.00 monthly car payment, as part 
of the alimony award, constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. We disagree. In the leading 
case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,1075 
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court delin-
eated three factors that the trial court 
must consider in fixing alimony awards: (1) 
the financial conditions and needs of the 
spouse seeking alimony; (2) the ability of 
the spouse seeking alimony to produce suf-
ficient income; and (3) the ability of the 
paying spouse to provide support. 
Plaintiff was 14 years of age when she 
and defendant were married. She now has 
custody of an infant daughter. She has 
*:not completed high school and has no voca-
tional or technical training. Though testi-
mony indicated plaintiff had worked at a 
cafe in Escalante and at seasonal employ-
ment at Escalante Sawmill, it will be diffi-
cult for her to gain employment with a 
salary commensurate with her estimated 
monthly expenses. By contrast, defendant 
is employed by Escalante Sawmill and had 
been for three and one-half years prior to 
the divorce proceedings. His 1985 earn-
ings were $1,691.83 a month. In the fu-
ture, he anticipates earning at least 
$1,450.00 a month. 
Plaintiff estimated her monthly expenses 
at $1,161.00 per month, which includes the 
monthly mobile home and car payments. 
Viewing her future earning potential and 
current monthly expenses against that of 
defendant convinces us that fixing the 
award at $425.00 per month until the loans 
on the mobfle home and car are satisfied is 
not an abuse of discretion.1 
Affirmed. Costs to Mrs. Smith. 
DAVIDSON and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that 
circumstances similar to these may be sufficient 
to support an award of permanent spousal sup-
port. Olson v. Olson, 704 ?2d 564, 567 (Utah 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v, 
Charles R. COX, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 870237-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 23, 1988. 
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit 
Court, Grand County, Bruce K. Halliday, 
J., of unlawful control of vehicle, and he 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
J., held that defendant's subjective knowl-
edge that his taking of automobile was 
without owner's permission was not ele-
ment of joyriding. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles <£=>339 
Defendant's subjective knowledge that 
his taking of automobile was without own-
er's permission was not element of joyrid-
ing. U.C.A.1953, 41-1-109. 
2. Automobiles e»355(10) 
Automobile owner's testimony that 
automobile was taken without his knowl-
edge or consent established that defendant 
intended to deprive owner of possession as 
element of joyriding, despite evidence that 
defendant was acquaintance of owner and 
had obtained owner's permission to use 
automobile on prior occasions. U.C.A.1953, 
41-1-109. 
3. Criminal Law *»1038.4, 1173.2(3) 
Trial court's failure in joyriding prose-
cution to instruct jury that it was free to 
find automobile owner's implied consent 
for defendant to use automobile in light of 
1985); see Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 102 
(Utah 1986). However, since the wife did not 
raise the duration of the alimony award on 
appeal, we do not consider it 
Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff, 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
WOODWARD v. WOODWARD Utah 431 
Cite as, Utah, 656 P.2d 431 
hether right to benefit or asset has ac-
crued in whole or in part during marriage, 
and, to extent that right has so accrued, it 
is subject to equitable distribution. 
Mildred L. WOODWARD, Defendant, 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
No. 18089. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
The First District Court^Box Elder 
County, VeNoy Christx)ffersen7T7granted 
djvorce^tH^ro"perty 5?vlsion7and husband 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., 
tield that: (1) trial court properly awarded 
wife share in that portion of husband's 
retirement benefits to which rights accrued| 
during marriage, notwithstanding that hus-
4. Divorce <s=>252.3(4) 
In divorce proceeding, trial court prop-
erly awarded wife one-half share in that 
portion of husband's government retire-
ment benefits to which rights accrued dur-
ing marriage, notwithstanding that hus-
band was not entitled to any such benefits 
until and unless he worked additional 15 
years at government job. 
5. Divorce <$=>252.3(4), 
<~~ Where husband's right to retirement 
benefits was contingent upon his working. 
an additional ljTyears, trial cour^ropeyy" 
awarded wife share in such benefits in form 
of_deferred distribution based upon fixed 
band was not entitled to such benefits u n t i t ^ ^ ^ — ^— 
he worked additional 15 years, and (2) years, 
award of such benefits was properly made 
in form of deferred distribution based upon 
fixed percentage. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Divorce <s=* 252.3(4) 
~~ Concept of "vesting" of retirement and^  
pension rights is inappropriate basis for de-
termining what property should be subject 
to equitable division in divorce proceeding. 
2. Divorce <s=> 252,3(1, 4) 
- In fashioning equitable property divi-
sion in divorce proceeding, court may take 
jinto consideration all pertinent circumstanc-
jes, encompassing all assets of every nature 
possessed by parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived, and in-
cluding retirement and pension rights; 
overruling Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d 
839. 
3. Divorce *=> 252.3(1) 
Whether resource is subject to distribu^ 
tion in divorce proceeding does not turn on 
whether spouse can presently use or control 
it, or on whether resource can be given 
present dollar value; essential criterion is 
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff, 
appellant and cross-respondent. 
Ben H. Hadfield, Brigham City, for de-
fendant, respondent and cross-appellant 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The plaintiff husband appeals from that 
portion of the trial court's decree of divorce 
which awarded to the defendant wife a 
portion of his retirement benefits. The 
husband argues that the court erred in con-
sidering, as a marital assets that portionjrf 
his pension which would be contributed by 
the government at some future date. 
The husband has worked as a civilian 
employee at Hill Air Force Base for fifteen 
years. Under his government pension plan, 
he has contributed $17,500 to the pension 
fund during that time. If he were to leave 
his_job now, he woul<T~receive only the 
amount of his contnbuH^^ZZlrTorder'£b 
receive "maximum benefits frqm_the plan, 
thejmsband woul^h^veJpjp_articipate in it 
for a total of 30 yearjs,_ At that time, the 
government would match the amount of his 
contributions and the husband could elect to 
receive the benefits as an annuity or as a 
lump sum. In its Findings of Fact, the trial 
656P3d—l\ 
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court stated that, because one-half of the 
30-year period occurred during the mar-
riage and because the wife is entitled to 
one-half of the amount accrued during that 
time, the wife was therefore "granted an 
equity interest of one-fourth of all proceeds 
which the [husband] receives on his retire-
merrtaccqunt. to be paid to [the wife] . . . 
as (Jfte_ husbancfl^receives the proceeds." 
The nTisband^oneeaes that the wife is enti-
tled to one-half o£the sum he has contribut-
ed during the f i f^n years of their mar-
riage. However, he^claims that she has no 
right or interest in the amount to be con-
tributed by the government at the time^of 
Kir'relirement becauseJfcatjjiUHint is con-
tingent upon his continued government em-
ployfrieht " ^ 
[1,2] The only authority cited by the 
husband for his position is Bennett v. Ben-
nett, Utah, 607 P.2d 839 (1980). In that 
case, this Court reversed a trial court's divi-
sion of the husband's retirement benefits 
because the government's future contribu.-. 
tion to the retirement fund was found to 
have "no present value." Id. at 840. How-
ever, in Dogu v. Dogu, Utah, 652 P.2d 1308 
(1982), we commented that "that holding 
reflected a failure of proof." Id. The wife 
urges the adoption of the position taken by 
the California Supreme Court in In re Mar-
riage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 
126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). There the court' 
held that "[plension rights, whether or not 
vested, represent a property interest; to 
the extent that such rights derive from' 
employment during coverture, they com-
prise a community asset subject to division 
in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63, 
126 Cal.Rptr. at 634-35T This case over-
ruled an earlier California case of long-
standing which had distinguished pension 
rights on the basis of whether the rights 
had vested. In the context of Utah law, we 
find it unnecessary to consider whether or 
1. In Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 
(1975), the court commented that "the concept 
of vesting should probably find no significant 
place in the developing law of equitable distri-
bution." Id. at 348,331 A.2d at 262. The court 
refers briefly to the origins of the vested inter-
est as it was associated with the concept of 
not the pension rights are "vested or non-
w^s^^^irrEnghrt'v. Englert, Utah, 576 
/ p ] & 1274(1978), we emphasized the equita-
» ble nature of proceedings dealing with the 
\ family, pointing out that the court may 
; take into consideration all of the pertinent 
' circumstances. These circumstances en-
' compass "all of the assets of every nature 
' possessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
j j n 5 fronT whatever source derived^and 
\ that this includes any such pension funcToF 
j insm^an^T Id. at 1276. To the extent that" 
, Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may limit the 
[ability of the court to consider all of the 
[parties' assets and circumstances, including 
'retirement and pension rights, it is express-
ly overruled. ^^ -
[3] In the instant case, the husband ar-
gues that because he cannot now benefit 
from the government's promised contribu-
tions to his pension at the time of retire-
ment, the wife should not receive any por-
tion of the benefits which are based on the 
government's participation. This argument 
fails to recognize that pension or retirement 
benefits are a form of deferred compensa-
tion by the employer.^ I f the rights to those 
benefits are acquired during the marriage, 
then the court must.at. least consider those 
benefits in making an equitable distribution 
of the marital assets. "The right to re-
ceiye monies in the future is unquestionably 
. . . an economic resource* subject to equita-
ble distribution based upon proper computa-
tion of its present dollar value/' Kikkerty. 
Kikkert, 111 NJ.Super. 471, 475, 427 A.2d 
76, 78 (1981) (emphasis and omission in orig-
inal) (quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 
464, 468, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977)), aff d, 88 
N J . 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). Whether that 
resource, is subject to distribution doesnot 
turn on whether, J.he_sgouse^can presently 
use or control it^or j>n whether the resource 
can be^gjvej^^n^ji i^ 
essential criterion is^whethe£VrightJo^e 
seisin and also to its use in connection with 
"vested rights" in discussions of Constitutional 
guaranties. We agree that this concept of 
"vesting" is an inappropriate basis for deter-
mining what property should be subject to eq-
uitable division in a divorce proceeding. 
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benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in 
part during tl tie marriage^ ~lo the extent 
that the_right^ has^ so archied it is subject to 
equitable distribution. 
[4] In the instant case, the husband 
must work for another fifteen years to 
qualify for the maximum benefits under 
the pension plan. He will not qualify in the 
twenty-ninth year or in the next to the last 
month. Because he must work for a total 
of thirty years, his pension benefits, includ-
ing any contribution by the government, 
are as dependent on the first fifteen years 
as the last fifteen. Thus, the wife is enti-
tled to share in that portion of the benefits 
to which the rights accrued during the mar-
riage. We hold that the trial court did not 
err in making equitable distribution of the 
husband's retirement benefits. 
[5] We also hold that the method used 
to distribute the retirement benefits was a 
proper exercise of the court's discretion. 
We agree with the discussion in Kikkert, 
supra, where it was stated: 
Long-term and deferred sharing of finan-
cial interests are obviously too susceptible 
to continued strife and hostility, circum-
stances which our courts traditionally 
strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible. This goal may be best accom-
plished, if a present value of the pension 
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other 
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all 
appropriate considerations, including the 
length of time the pensioner must survive 
to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of 
other assets leaving all pension benefits 
to _the employee himself. 
On the other hand, where other assets 
for equitable distribution are inadequate 
or lacking altogether, or where no 
present value can be establish md *he 
parties are unable to reach agreement 
resort must be had to a form of deferred 
distribution based upon fixed percent-
ages^ 
Id. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79-80. The facts in 
the present case present just such a circum-
stance: other assets available for equitable 
distribution are inadequate, and a present 
value of retirement benefits would be dif fi-
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cult if not impossible to ascertain because 
[the value of the benefits is contingent on 
the husband's decision to remain working 
for the government In such a case, "the 
trial court could use a method widely em-
ployed in other states, whereby the trial 
court determines what percentage of" the 
niarital property each spouse is to receive, 
and then divides payments from the pension 
plan accordingly." Selchert v. Selchert, 90 
Wis.2d 1, 10, 280 N.W.2d 293, 298 (1979). 
The Wisconsin court continued: 
Under this approach it is unnecessary to 
make any determination as to the value 
of the pension fund.. . . When the bene-
ficiary spouse then opts to receive pay-
ments under the pension plan, the non-
covered spouse would be entitled to her 
established percentage of those pay-
ments Any risk associated with the 
fund . . . would be by this method appor-
tioned equally between the parties. This 
method may [sic] particularly appropriate 
wHire the~presehT~value of a pension 
fund is very difficult or impossible to 
assess. 
Id. at 10-12, 280 N.W.2d at 298 (footnotes 
omitted). 
The trial court awarded one-half of the 
marital property to each of the parties in 
the instant case It is clear that the court 
intended the wife to receive one-half of the 
retirement benefits which had accrued dur-
ing the fifteen-year marriage. However, in 
its order, the court specified that the wife 
receive one-fourth of the proceeds of the 
retirement plan as they are received by the 
husband. This portion, one-fourth, awards 
to the wife one-half of the benefits accrued 
during the marriage only if the husband 
works for the full thirty years. The order 
should be modified to provide for the wife 
to receive one-half of the benefits accrued 
<d . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
during the marriage, regardless of the 
length of time the husband continues in the 
same employment Whenever the husband 
chooses to terminate his government em-
ployment, the marital property subject to 
distribution is a portion of the retirement 
benefits represented by the number of 
years of the marriage divided by the num-
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ber of years of the husband's employment. 
The wife is entitled to one-half of that 
portion pursuant to the award of the trial 
judge in this case, which our modification is 
intended to sustain. 
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in 
part and remand to the trial court so that 
the order may be amended to conform with 
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
O £ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowen, 
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, her 
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, 
v. 
RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, Sterling R. Draper and Enoch 
Smith Sons Company, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 17732. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
In a personal injury action, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S. 
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment for 
city and subsequently, pursuant to motions 
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dis-
missed all claims, counterclaims and cross 
claims with prejudice except for claim 
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, *T., held that: (I) 
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether 
city fulfilled its duty to maintain city 
streets in safe condition was question of 
fact for jury, precluding summary judg-
ment. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. 
1. Appeal and Error <&=>430(1) 
Since failure to file timely notice of 
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal if notice 
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 
42(a), 73(a). 
2. Appeal and Error <s=>344, 428(2) 
Trial court's April 13 order, entered 
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both 
consolidated actions, was final judgment in 
each case for purpose of calculating timeli-
ness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on 
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely 
filed appeal from trial court's grant of sum-
mary judment on January 26 for city. 
3. Judgment <s=»181(2, 3) 
Summary judgment is proper only if 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admis-
sions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as matter of law. 
4. Judgment *=»185(2) 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, doubt should 
be resolved in favor of opposing party on 
motion for summary judgment and thus 
court must evaluate all evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from ev-
idence in light most favorable to party op-
posing summary judgment. 
5. Judgment <*=>180 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
in the most clear-cut negligence cases. 
6. Municipal Corporations «=> 757(1) 
City has nondelegable duty to exercise 
due care in maintaining streets within its 
corporate boundaries in reasonably safe 
condition for travel and may be held liable 
for injuries proximately resulting from jts 
failure to do so. 
7. Municipal Corporations <*=>798 
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty to 
maintain streets^ it is necessary for cities to 
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe, 
visible and working condition. 
